

JPRS-WER-86-117

4 DECEMBER 1986

# West Europe Report

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## SURVEY SHOWS MAJORITY SUPPORTS USE OF NUCLEAR POWER

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 18 Sep 86 p 9

[Unattributed Article: "Allensbach Survey Shows Majority Supports Use of Nuclear Power: German Atomic Forum's Survey After Chernobyl"]

[Text] Bonn (DPA)--The German Atomic Forum has found that, even after the catastrophic Soviet reactor accident at Chernobyl, 57 percent of West Germans support the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while 32 percent want to shut down Germany's nuclear power plants. Eleven percent have no definite opinion on the subject. Such were the results of a representative survey taken among 2000 adults published yesterday by the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy.

The survey, which was conducted between May and July, was commissioned by the Information Center for Nuclear Energy and was carried out by the Atomic Forum. The Committee for the Promotion of Peaceful Users of Nuclear Energy explained that, among other things, the respondents were shown a picture of two people arguing. They were then asked to side with one or the other's opinion. One opinion read: "If the FRG were to be the only country to give up nuclear energy, nothing would be gained, because nuclear plants in neighboring countries would still put us at risk" (57 percent agreed). The same 57 percent also agreed with additional statements such as, "we have to build additional nuclear power plants" or "we have to continue to use existing plants." Thirty-four percent said: "We should stop the production of nuclear energy completely and shut down existing nuclear power plants."

The Atomic Forum also said that the number of people opposed to nuclear energy has doubled since 1984, while the number of those advocating nuclear energy has dropped by 12 percent. A similar shift in public opinion was observed after the incident at the U.S. nuclear power plant at Harrisburg in 1979.

The German Atomic Forum pointed to another finding of the Allensbach survey, similar to 1984, that about 42 percent of those polled think nuclear power plants are environmentally cleaner than conventional power plants. Forty-four percent think that nuclear energy makes better sense economically and is cheaper. An overwhelming majority (72 percent) is convinced that the economy would suffer if nuclear energy were abandoned completely. Radioactive waste is still the number-one concern of those questioned (75 percent). Only one-fifth (19 percent) believe that German reactors are as unsafe as the Chernobyl plant.

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

WULF-MATHIES FAVORED TO SUCCEED BREIT AS DGB CHIEF IN 1990

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Sep 86 p 9

[Article by KLR: "Speculation About Breit's Succession Favors Ms Wulf-Mathies--Goetz and Viehof Also Candidates for DGB Chairman"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 23 Sep--In early summer, Ernst Breit, 62, was reconfirmed for another 4 years as chief of the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB). However, rumors are already flying about as to who his successor might be 4 years from now. Trade union insiders mention as a possible "favorite" Monika Wulf-Mathies, born 1942. She comes from the Bonn (SPD) political scene, and currently heads the Union of Public Service, Transportation, and Traffic (OTV). Some say her prospects are enhanced by the fact that she is a woman.

Some trade unionists have come to suspect she harbors such ambitions after her appearance at the last national congress in Hamburg, where she made an impassioned plea for the rights of workers; while at the same time assuring the president of the FRG that "this state, based on federal law, is also our state, a state we have helped to build." Ms Wulf-Mathies added that, "whenever trade unionists take the federal government severely to task, they are actually defending the basic laws of the nation's constitution," adding that a united union is the "most effective weapon against capital and the power of the employer."

Back in May, Ms Wulf-Mathies said that unity also demands self-restraint and the renunciation of maximum positions "should they fail to appeal to a broad audience." She also said that the trade unions' independence from political parties protects them from "being taken in tow" by the parties. To underline her position, the OTV chief said: "Our strength and ability to prevail lies in the very fact that the DGB stands for the German trade union movement itself and knows no pluralism, no particularism, and no political factionalism. That is why we favor a united trade union without ifs and buts."

Whether or not the speculations about Ms Wulf-Mathies as Breit's successor--she would be the first female chief of the DGB--have a serious foundation or not, the question still remains why once more somebody from the Public Services Union--Breit came from the Postal Union--is to head the DGB leadership. Trade union insiders have opined that either the leaders of the "hard industrial trade unions" have no interest in heading the relatively powerless DGB executive organ or that they are too old or would not stand a chance of getting elected.

## Trade Unionists Are Amused

Another person mentioned as a possible successor to Breit is Siegfried Bleicher, a member of the DGB's national executive board. He is, among other things, responsible for questions dealing with technology, but he is planning on running for an executive office in the Metalworkers Union this coming October. Trade union officials have no difficulty envisioning CDU-member Hanshorst Viehof, born 1940, as Bleicher's possible successor on the DGB's national executive board. In 1980, Viehof served on the executive board of the Union of Commerce, Banking, and Insurance Workers (HBV), where he was responsible for economic policy. After the "Bonner Development" [Wende], Labor Minister Bluem took him into the ministry as chief of the sections for "labor policy, unemployment insurance, and policies concerning aliens." His appointment caused some puzzlement, not only within the DGB, because the HBV trade union has a reputation of being "left oriented," and nobody knows of instances where Viehof has not agreed with HBV policy.

It was said at that time, too, that Bluem was bent on improving the new government coalition's relations with the trade unions. Viehof stated his new position in 1983, but did not last long. In December 1985, he retired for the time being.

Christian Goetz, who has been brought into the game by his own HBV union, is allegedly another candidate to succeed Bleicher. He takes care of youth employment and is known to be sympathetic to the "left." It seems that several DGB officials have let it be known that they are not keen on having Goetz on the DGB national board. It would take a two-thirds majority of the DGB national executive committee to get Goetz into Bleicher's position.

What so obviously amuses some trade union leaders is the idea that the CDU man, Viehof, could be elected to the DGB national executive board. "Just imagine," they muse, "a third CDU member on the board before the impending national elections," where he would join Ms Irmgard Blaettel and the DGB Vice President Gustav Fehrenbach. After a while, Viehof could replace the aging Fehrenbach, and that way, the DGB executive board would once more have its "usual two CDU members."

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POLITICAL

PORUGAL

CAVACO SILVA'S RELUCTANCE TO AID UNITA CREATES PROTEST

Cavaco Silva's Attitude 'Perplexing'

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Sep 86 p 1

[Commentary by Vera Lagoa: "September of My Discontent"]

[Excerpts] I say "September of my discontent" because I have actually met people who are not discontented. Surprising but true.

At this moment in September, at this moment at which I am writing--on this Sunday morning--a very fine rain is falling, and it is even dampening my heart. Because my heart is sad. It is discontented.

There is a very fine rain and a gray sky on what was supposed to be a morning with radiant sunshine. But no. That very fine rain and that gray sky can be and are being gotten over.

What cannot be gotten over is the anguish caused by certain statements which I do not understand (does anyone understand them?) and which were made by a prime minister whom I support (critically). Not his statements concerning Timor, because they have already been denied, but those concerning the request or suggestion that support--extremely important support in this case--be withdrawn from UNITA.

Is Cavaco Silva trying to insinuate that if UNITA disappears the Cubans will disappear? Don't make me laugh. Those Cubans will never leave Angola. But if they ever do, it will be precisely because of UNITA's strength and the persistence and courage of Savimbi (to whom I pay tribute for his patriotism). That persistence and courage can continue to manifest themselves only with extremely strong support in the form of financing and weapons. Sa Carneiro--since there is so much insistence, sometimes hypocritical, on his example--always felt that way.

I have no doubt that the United States is supporting Savimbi. Perhaps that makes up for the fact that at one point it was at Luanda's gates but then withdrew. The matter is beyond me. But even today I am ashamed at the way in which the Alvor Accord has been "carried out."

Savimbi says that the matter will be resolved among the Angolans. Very good. That was what the above-mentioned accord said. Fidel intends to keep the Cubans in Angola and said so just recently, which leaves me even more perplexed by Cavaco Silva's (extremely confused) attitude. That is the reason for my discontent.

The rain is continuing to sadden me. Doubts are continuing to sadden Portugal. As the poet would say.

My heart is discontented.

'Realpolitik' Seen Risky

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 13 Sep 86 p 16

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice: "Between Jamba and Luanda"]

[Excerpt] It is true that Cavaco Silva is little more than a novice in matters of international relations and such things, and it is true that no one who wants to tell the truth can say that he is surrounded by renowned and experienced specialists in that field. This is not meant to belittle the intellectual and human qualities (which are not the same thing as experience and knowledge) of the team in charge of foreign affairs, a team which, by the way, I not only admire but also esteem. No one will be surprised, therefore, to see a few errors being committed, a few blunders appearing in their speeches, or a degree of naiveness sometimes appearing in their actions. But for one thing, an intelligent man learns fast, and for another, Cavaco Silva is prime minister for reasons of domestic politics, and in that context, foreign policy is, from the standpoint of the reasons why he is leader, a comparatively secondary field.

That being said, it is worthwhile to bring up the question of the statements concerning UNITA and Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] which have been attributed to him in the media and which, objectively, revealed a veiled hostility toward the guerrilla movements in question and an alignment in his talks with the U.S. administration--based on a view of international politics that is not "realistic"--with defense of the thesis advanced by the petroleum lobby and the Luanda government, which says that when all is said and done, UNITA is an obstacle to "peace" and that stability in the area does not exist because support for UNITA is preventing its annihilation. The media may be reporting his words incorrectly, but it is no secret that the official Portuguese position has changed under the current government. Previously, it was Sa Carneiro's strategy that prevailed (privileged and cordial political relations with UNITA, neutrality on the part of the Portuguese state, and a government-to-government relationship governed by international law with the authorities in Luanda). With Pires de Miranda, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] came to be seen politically as the natural interlocutor, limited only by the fact that it had not yet freed itself of Soviet-Cuban protection--which would be much reduced if UNITA did not exist.

Because of the "arcana" it possesses, international politics is by nature a secretive or discreet area. It may be that domestic public opinion is unaware of factors which, from the standpoint of national interest, justify or even require a tactical or strategic shift. It may even be that the idea that nothing in the Angolan struggle is going to change over the next few years justifies a rapprochement with the MPLA, on which, after all, the big contracts governing exports, investment, or technology transfer depend.

The only thing is that a few doubts and a few certainties must manifestly be considered in this connection. To exemplify, some of the doubts are these: does Portugal's negotiating power with respect to Angola increase or decrease as a result of "alignment" with the government in Luanda? Is it true that "the pressures being exerted on the MPLA by UNITA" are having a moderating effect on Soviet influence--whether seriously or not--or, on the contrary, can it be that if there were no guerrilla warfare, Angola would be a kind of Ivory Coast? Does Portugal's national interest require relations with whoever is in power in Luanda or require that we support the MPLA? In other words, is Portugal's foreign policy in relation to Angola a matter of "Realpolitik" or a policy based on ideological vectors?

There are also a number of certainties which seem undeniable. For good and for evil, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] was once the party enjoying privileged relations with UNITA, but it is now losing that status to the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and the PS [Socialist Party]. Portuguese voters with ties in Africa, who carry decisive weight in domestic political solutions, were showing a significant tendency to vote for the PSD after again taking refuge in abstention following the death of Sa Carneiro or, in some cases, supporting the CDS. Whether rightly or wrongly, those voters are strongly opposed to the MPLA and FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front], and it is no accident that the first forceful criticism of Cavaco Silva that I have heard on that subject over the past few months has come from areas that vote for the PSD.

Beyond those doubts and certainties, one thing seems certain. One of the basic reasons that could justify the Portuguese Government's apparent shift in tactics or strategy is the idea that a neutral position on the Angolan internal struggle has the effect of harming Portuguese economic interests and even its interest in protecting Portuguese who are still working in the area controlled by the MPLA. That is why the advocates of a rapprochement with Luanda usually claim that the opposite thesis is pure idealism, that it is expensive, and that a small country cannot afford to implement it on the external level, especially when dealing with issues and areas that are a priority in its policy.

Let it be admitted that that is true, at least as a hypothesis for argument. And if it is true, the logical consequence is that a political rapprochement with the governments in Angola and Mozambique will have the effect, first of all, of turning Portugal into a privileged interlocutor for those governments and turning Portuguese firms into obvious and favored partners in economic relations, not to mention an immediate end to the generally unpunished and tolerated violations of the most basic human rights of Portuguese working in

those countries. So often those workers are arrested and mistreated, and no one hears even the vehement protests by Portuguese authorities that would be justified in such cases.

The fact is that a curious feature exists in relation to the former Portuguese territories in Africa. The stand on UNITA that has been adopted by such countries as France or even the United States is such that Savimbi has even been received as a chief of state, but that has not prevented the Luanda government from wanting closer diplomatic and economic ties. But in the case of Portugal, there are threats one after the other and intensifying boycotts as part of what some people say is an unconscious attempt by Angola to transform Portugal into its colony.

Like everything else, Realpolitik has its advantages and its disadvantages, especially when taken to extremes. The minimum requirement is that it should at least have positive results. And quick ones.

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CSO: 3542/7

POLITICAL.

PORUGAL

POSITIVE COMMENTS ON VISIT TO SAVIMBI'S UNITA

Joao Soares Interview

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 11 Sep 86 p 8

[Interview with publisher Joao Soares by Carlos Pires; date and place not given; first paragraph is TEMPO introduction]

[Text] Joao Soares, the son of the president of the republic, was one of the most significantly conspicuous guests at the 6th UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] Congress, which was held in Angolan territory in August and from which he returned last Saturday. According to what he himself told TEMPO, "there was no reason to reject Jonas Savimbi's invitation," which he accepted in his capacity as the first publisher of one of Savimbi's books in Portugal. "I would not want anyone at all, including my father, to be held responsible for an attitude that is strictly my own," he told us. In the opinion of Joao Soares, "the reality of UNITA is very poorly known in Portugal, and it has been the target of a campaign of slander and propaganda that has completely deceived public opinion."

TEMPO: Why did you agree to attend the 6th UNITA Congress?

Joao Soares: I feel that there was no reason to reject Jonas Savimbi's invitation to visit the zone controlled by UNITA in the interior of Angola. Jonas Savimbi is an Angolan politician; he invited me to go there because I was the first to publish a book of his in Portugal, and so there was no reason to reject his invitation.

TEMPO: What was your first impression on encountering the reality of UNITA?

Joao Soares: Frankly, it was one of amazement. Amazement at what has been achieved there--amazement and admiration for the work that has been achieved there in so short a time.

The reality of UNITA is very poorly known in Portugal, it has been the target of a campaign of slander and propaganda that has completely deceived public opinion, and I myself admit that to some extent, I was quite poorly informed about what had happened and is happening in Angola.

TEMPO: Is UNITA accepted by the population it controls? Is it in fact established and organized?

Joao Soares: On the basis of what I was able to observe, I would not be truthful if I did not say that UNITA is extremely well organized and that it has cadres who are solid, intelligent, capable, and trained politically and militarily. It was in fact a very big surprise for me, and it has a leader who is perhaps one of the greatest African leaders of our time. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying it. He is a very cultured man, well educated and well informed, extremely intelligent, and an uncommon speaker.

TEMPO: Were there many foreign guests?

Joao Soares: When we arrived, the congress was practically over. A few foreign delegates had been at the opening session, along with several reporters. Besides them, there were the chairman of Centrist Youth, Manuel Monteiro, a friend of mine named Duarte Teives, and Marise de Oliveira from Nova Nordica, who, like me, had been invited because she is one of Savimbi's publishers.

TEMPO: Do you intend to publish any more books about Jonas Savimbi or UNITA?

Joao Soares: There are no specific plans at the moment, but if the opportunity arises, I will not shy away from doing it.

TEMPO: Didn't the fact that Joao Soares is the son of the president of the republic cause you any problems when it came to accepting UNITA's invitation?

Joao Soares: Well, I must tell you that I did not accept the first invitation, which was issued a week before I left, and the reason was precisely that I did not want to give cause for any speculation or confusion. Obviously, I would not want anyone at all, including my father, to be held responsible for a strictly personal attitude that was entirely up to me.

TEMPO: From what you were able to observe, is the population controlled by UNITA experiencing shortages or not?

Joao Soares: I can tell you I know something about the realities of Africa and especially the Portuguese-speaking countries. I was in Portuguese Guinea and Sao Tome after decolonization and when my father was deported there, and I have also been to Luanda. What I saw in the vast zone controlled by UNITA was enough to permit me to say, as far as the population is concerned, that the situation is not the same in any other Portuguese-speaking African country. The people were wearing shoes, they were adequately dressed and, from what I could see, were not having any problems with food. As a matter of fact, judging from the farming operations we saw, it can be confirmed that in the areas it controls, UNITA is managing to ensure levels of self-supply for the population that are extremely reasonable by African standards.

TEMPO: On the basis of your brief experience in Angolan territory, what is your opinion concerning the future of that country?

Joao Soares: There is an undeniable reality which became very clear at the congress, and it is that it is impossible for the Russians, the Cubans, and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], which brought them into Angola, to eliminate UNITA militarily. UNITA has established itself and now controls a substantial part of Angolan territory. In those circumstances, there will be no solution except a negotiated one, which necessarily means the withdrawal of foreign troops: Russian, Cuban, and also South African if there are any.

TEMPO: One of Jonas Savimbi's objectives is to hold elections in Angola. Does that seem possible to you, or is it utopian?

Joao Soares: I am not an expert on African affairs, but why should elections not be possible in Angola if they were, for example, in former Rhodesia? For that matter, Portugal is bound by the Alvor Accords to hold elections in Angola to determine which of the three Angolan movements that fought against Portuguese colonialism should exercise power in that country in a democratic way.

TEMPO: Do you feel it is reasonable to call UNITA a "puppet group," which is what it is usually called by the government of Jose Eduardo Santos?

Joao Soares: Not at all! I feel that it would not enter anyone's head, especially after observing what UNITA is, to say that UNITA is a puppet group in the service of South Africa or anybody else.

TEMPO: What is the UNITA Army's state of mind toward the MPLA? Could it be said that hatred is being stirred up?

Joao Soares: That is perhaps the thing that surprised me most during my brief visit to Angolan territory. It would be natural to find a lot of propaganda and an atmosphere of hate toward the MPLA, but frankly, I did not observe anything like that. Quite the contrary. The propaganda is directed against the presence of foreign forces, not against the MPLA. UNITA feels that regardless of the mistakes that may have been made by the MPLA's current leadership, it is going to be essential to sit down at the same table to discuss the future of Angola.

CDS Deputy on UNITA

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Sep 86 p 17

[Report on interview with Manuel Monteiro, CDS deputy and chairman of Centrist Youth, by J.L.; date and place not given]

[Text] "According to its chairman, Jonas Savimbi, UNITA wants and desires peace, but for peace to be possible, it is important for the Russians and Cubans to leave Angolan soil. Incidentally, the 40,000 Cubans in Angola (more than the Portuguese Army had there during the war in that former overseas province) are pillaging villages and raping women while the Luanda government stands passively by." That is what we were told by Manuel Monteiro, deputy

and chairman of Centrist Youth, concerning the visit he recently made to that African nationalist movement's base in Jamba.

Having attended the 6th UNITA Congress at UNITA's invitation as part of a group of Portuguese guests, Manuel Monteiro was able to get a close look at the reality of the war pitting Savimbi's movement against the communist forces of FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] (MPLA) and the Cubans.

Manuel Monteiro emphasized to us: "One Cuban who had surrendered to UNITA when he was about 17 years of age (he is probably about 21 years old now) told us that he had been told in Cuba that he was going to Angola to fight against South Africa. But he encountered a very different reality later, when he found that his fighting was directed exclusively against UNITA.

"Incidentally, that is not the only peculiarity to be noted in this conflict: SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] and the ANC [African National Congress], which have 'stretched' their main bases into northern Angola (it makes one want to ask if that is where they encounter the South Africans) often serve as the 'advance guard' for the MPLA, according to what I was told by UNITA officials. UNITA's leaders went so far as to say that SWAPO soldiers disguised in their [UNITA's] uniforms enter villages to steal, trying in that way to instigate revolt against Jonas Savimbi's movement."

Manuel Monteiro also told us that UNITA now enjoys solid U.S. arms support and has been progressively establishing itself in Angola, as is shown both by the existing bases and by the untold quantity of Russian war materiel which is captured and later used in the struggle against the MPLA.

#### Presence of Rosa Coutinho's Mercenaries

Another aspect conveyed to Manuel Monteiro by UNITA's leaders has to do with the presence on Angolan soil of Portuguese mercenaries in the service of the MPLA.

On that subject, the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader told us:

"A high official in UNITA, General Wambo, told me that those mercenaries had been hired in Portugal by the regrettably well-known Rosa Coutinho and that their chief purpose is to provide military training for FAPLA's soldiers. Incidentally, according to UNITA leaders, those 'soldiers'--most of them 14, 15, or 16 years of age--are sent to the front with only 2 weeks of military training (Savimbi's movement gives its recruits about 6 months of intensive training)."

At the Jamba base, Manuel Monteiro also visited hospitals, production units, and schools, where he noted that the instruction is given in Portuguese.

He engaged in significant dialogue with a young doctor who, after being connected with the MPLA, now carries on his profession at that UNITA military base:

"He told me about the unique way in which the MPLA treats its war wounded: since it has little time in which to treat them, certain slight injuries to legs or arms are treated by amputation when the victims are not simply abandoned to their fate. The same doctor told me it was imperative for a delegation upholding human rights or even the International Red Cross to check out the conditions in which the MPLA's wounded are 'treated,' because the best treatment is channeled to the Russians and Cubans."

Manuel Monteiro's final impression of his 20-day visit to Angolan territory controlled by UNITA is that "the Portuguese Government cannot continue to ignore the strength and established presence that Jonas Savimbi's movement now has in Angola."

The CDS deputy added: "Ignoring UNITA is not the best way to protect Portuguese interests and the interests of our compatriots who have returned from Angola. It did not ask us to support it publicly; it only wanted Portugal and the Portuguese not to forget that Angola is at war and that its young people are entitled to a better future."

Savimbi Message to Youth

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 11 Sep 86 p 4

[Excerpt] Almost coinciding with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva's statements in Washington concerning support for UNITA, Centrist Youth held a meeting with reporters yesterday to present them with a message sent by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to Portuguese young people.

The message reads as follows:

"This war is leading Angolan young people to their deaths. The Russians and Cubans who are in Angola are using their lives to rob and mistreat our people.

"Portuguese young people, who are living in peace and freedom, cannot remain silent in the face of this situation. Our young people want to live in democracy, freedom, and harmony. Our young people who are combating communist tyranny and dictatorship by giving up their lives for a free Angolan fatherland are hoping for solidarity and support from Portuguese young people.

"We want peace, and we want our young people to have the future they deserve.

"You who have freedom and peace must raise your voices to demand that the Russians and Cubans leave our fatherland so that all of us can live hand in hand."

The chairman of Centrist Youth, Manuel Monteiro, has just returned from Angola, where, at UNITA's invitation, he attended the congress held by Jonas Savimbi's movement and visited several bases in Angolan territory. As is known, the congress was held in the town of Jamba, which UNITA considers "the provisional capital of Angola."

Expressing the position of Centrist Youth--an organization which is autonomous but not independent of the CDS and which therefore shares the views held by that party's leadership--Manuel Monteiro emphasized the West's responsibility in the face of the communist offensive against southern Africa. That offensive is made obvious, incidentally, by the presence of Cuban troops and countless "advisers" from every Eastern country.

In view of that, the chairman of Centrist Youth criticized the statements made the day before yesterday by Cavaco Silva in favor of cutting off the support that the West has been giving UNITA.

On the other hand, Manuel Monteiro expressed his confidence in the possibility that Portuguese would emigrate to Angola if law and order were restored to that country and if the conditions were created for a government that would include participation by UNITA.

Lastly, the leader of the CDS young people's group analyzed the situation in South Africa, emphasizing the level-headed approach that Portugal must take because of the approximately 700,000 Portuguese residing in that country.

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CSO: 3542/5

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

POLITICIANS CRITICIZE PALMLUND COMMENTS ON REFUGEES

Daily Interviews Palmlund

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "Palmlund Says Sweden Cannot Handle Any More Refugees"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Sweden cannot handle the number of asylum seekers who are coming here today, according to Thord Palmlund, director general of the Immigration Department. The number has doubled since spring. There are not enough resources to give refugees an opportunity to make a good life here. And that in turn affects public opinion and can lead to increased hostility to foreigners.

Refugees come to Sweden from different parts of the world but right now the biggest increase is in the number of Iranian refugees. In the spring there were 600-700 asylum seekers a month. Now the figure has climbed to 1,700 in the past month.

"This is close to the limit of the number we can handle," said Thord Palmlund. "I would like to have a large refugee quota but I can also see that we have more refugees today than we can handle in a satisfactory way."

Thord Palmlund is very sympathetic with all those who want to come to Sweden. Most asylum seekers from Iran are fleeing from a regime that most people would want to get away from, he said, as well as from a bloody war.

"From a purely human point of view it is easy to understand them, regardless of what has happened to their passports and what documents they bring with them. In many cases they have a well-justified fear of staying in their homeland. But even so most of them do not fit the Geneva Convention definition of a refugee.

"Many flee to avoid active military service in Iran and that is something that is very difficult for Swedish authorities to disprove. If that is the case the Swedish Alien Act allows the refugee to stay in this country.

"If they have fled from active service there is a big risk that the authorities may take steps against them," said Thord Palmlund.

"At the moment Sweden has a refugee immigration load that is clearly close to the limit of what we can handle," said the head of the Immigration Department.

"We have a hard time processing the 1,700 people a month who are now seeking asylum in this country. In addition our opportunity to pursue an active refugee policy is limited and this complicates the desirable improved arrangement for international refugee work."

#### Why Not More?

But Sweden is a big country and a relatively rich one. Why can't we take in more of these suffering and persecuted people?

"The world refugee problem is broader than Iran alone, the country that is currently responsible for the biggest increase," said Thord Palmlund. "The industrialized world cannot solve the problems of the Third World (the developing nations) via immigration. We have limited reception possibilities and those we do have must be used in particular for the refugees who have a strong need to find sanctuary or who have ties to Sweden. Therefore the only thing we can do is check the free flow of refugees. And this applies not only to refugees but to those who want to leave their homelands for other reasons as well."

#### Danish Example

Thord Palmlund cited Denmark as an example of how hard it is for a country that liberalizes its immigration policy, as that country did 2 years ago. Now the Danes must review their refugee policy. They cannot cope with the rapidly increasing flood of people seeking help.

"The minute we open our borders we can expect a substantial increase in the number of asylum seekers. Sweden has a large geographical area but it is not a question of taking people in and putting them out in the woods. They must be given a real chance to get back on their own feet.

"That in turn is a basic prerequisite if Sweden and the Swedish people are to accept refugees and immigrants without allowing hostility to foreigners to gain a foothold.

"We must try to keep the situation under control," said Thord Palmlund. "If people get the impression that we have unlimited immigration it will stimulate aggression and unrest. A refugee policy that allows immigration within the limits that we can handle and within the limits of what Swedish communities can assimilate is a sensible way of reducing the number of problems."

### Important to Set Limits

Restrictions are necessary, according to Thord Palmlund, as well as understanding people's situation. But he feels the administration must be provided with resources. A large part of the negative picture of refugees and immigrants is the fault of inadequate resources. When Swedes see refugees who have no work permit walking around and waiting to hear if they will be allowed to stay, they become irritated.

Warmhearted molders of public opinion sometimes say that Sweden could double the number of refugees it takes in, Thord Palmlund pointed out.

"In 3 years we have increased the number from 5,000 to this year's 12-13,000. Should we double the figure once again?

Thord Palmlund said that there has been an enormous improvement in a short time on the part of communities whose active and positive involvement has helped to create room for more refugees in many cases. Then are things all right the way they are now? No, the head of the Immigration Department did not think so:

"We can't keep up. People are staying too long in refugee camps and that is destructive. There is not enough money for instruction in Swedish which is a prerequisite for adjusting to society. There are big gaps in administration. The policy and the apparatus were not designed for the number of refugees that are coming here now."

Sweden must give the police the resources to enable them to patrol the borders and check passports, trip organizers and other things, in Thord Palmlund's opinion. Has Sweden reached its limit when it comes to its ability to take in people from other countries who are seeking help?

"I will not speculate about that," said Thord Palmlund. "We have pushed our level up and we should be glad that we are taking care of the number of refugees and immigrants we have now and the number that we are continuing to get. But I do not believe there will be any radical changes in policy in this respect."

### Parties Support Open Policy

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Mats Carlbom and Bo Westmar: "No Party Support for Palmlund"]

[Text] The time is ripe for the prime minister to initiate an international step concerning the refugee problem. The work to arrive at an agreement on the distribution of refugees among the European countries must be stepped up.

Ingemar Eliasson (Liberal) made these remarks to DAGENS NYHETER and both the Left-Communist Party [VPK] and the Conservatives were in agreement with him.

Thord Palmlund, director general of the Immigration Department, said in a DAGENS NYHETER interview on Saturday that Sweden cannot handle as many asylum seekers as it has today. He pointed out that the number of refugees coming to Sweden has increased from between 600 and 700 in the spring to 1,700 today.

"Thord Palmlund has a unique ability to say the wrong thing at the wrong time," commented Riksdag member Alexander Chrisopoulos, the VPK spokesman on refugee issues.

#### More Money

"The mistake he makes is to confuse the Immigration Department's budget, which has been cut by Riksdag, with Sweden's resources. And he did so in the middle of the Refugee '86 campaign which led to a positive debate on the refugee question."

VPK feels that more money is needed for the Immigration Department today to enable it to handle the current wave of refugees and that we should have a more generous refugee policy in Sweden in the future than we have today.

The idea that Sweden should put a lid on the number of refugees today was rejected by all the Riksdag parties because that would conflict with the Geneva Convention to which we are committed.

"For many years we have had an uneven influx of refugees," said Ingemar Eliasson. "But it is hard for me to comprehend that we have reached the limit of what we can handle now."

#### Initiative

"The situation in Europe has reached the point where the prime minister should take the initiative immediately to bring about an international agreement on the distribution of refugees in Europe," said Ingemar Eliasson.

"This is a question of Europe's responsibility to the Third World."

He was fully supported by VPK member Alexander Chrisopoulos.

"Sweden has not done enough to bring about an international agreement on the distribution of refugees," he said. "On the contrary, the European nations are currently competing over the best way to protect their borders from refugees."

The Conservatives also said that we cannot set a ceiling on how many refugees Sweden will accept because that would be contrary to the refugee convention.

"Due to the fact that the number of asylum seekers is very large at certain times, our resources are not always adjusted to the situation," said Gunnel Liljegren, the Conservative Party spokesman on refugee issues and deputy member of the Immigration Department committee.

## Increase Resources

"Of course we must increase the resources if there are more refugees. But getting an international agreement in Europe on the distribution of refugees would be something of a feat. I agree with Ingemar Eliasson that the prime minister should take the initiative now to speed up this effort."

Karin Soder of the Center Party also stressed how important it is for countries to cooperate with each other and with the United Nations to solve the refugee problem.

"Of course we can take in more refugees. After all we are a welfare state, even if we are a small one. However I share Thord Palmlund's view that each refugee should have his case reviewed properly and that we must take care of the refugees properly. And for that more money may be necessary," said Karin Soder.

Thord Palmlund is just fishing for more money in the supplemental budget, in the view of Immigration Minister Anita Gradin.

"But Palmlund can calm down, the question is being looked into at this time," said Gradin. "What is involved is more money to strengthen the Immigration Department's research section and extra funds for new refugee camps and additional personnel.

"This kind of thing is tricky because one cannot make a permanent allocation. The stream of refugees tends to come in waves.

"What happens is that refugees have to stay a little longer at the camps and the paper work takes a little longer. But our camps are not that bad," Anita Gradin said.

"If the influx of refugees increases further, we can take a stand on the matter at that time. It is quite a different thing that international co-operation is needed to create regional solutions," said the Immigration Minister.

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SOCIAL

FRANCE

## ISLAM: ACTIVITIES: LIBYAN, IRANIAN, TURKISH INFLUENCES

Paris ESPRIT in French Oct 86 pp 1-30

[Article by Jean-Francois Legrain: "Islam in France. French Islam"] (Footnote 1) (This text is abridged from a study distributed by the Secretariat of the French Bishops' Council for Relations with Islam) (Footnote 2) (Jean-Francois Legrain is a teacher at the Catholic Institute of Paris)]

[Text] The following study seeks to relieve the exaggerated fears often fed by flagrant ignorance of the facts concerning emigration and immigration. Although it deals with the religious aspect of the character of these communities, nevertheless, it does not deny the importance or even the decisive significance of other factors affecting them. In no case does it conclude that ideological "superstructures" are all powerful in determining their character. To speak in general terms about the "Muslims in France" no doubt is a matter of methodological convenience. (But do we speak of the "Christian people" in France?) In this connection we are speaking of people who, whether voluntarily or not, belong to the Islamic cultural sphere, without prejudging their degree of support for their faith or what their faith says. The great majority of these people belong to the same social category, usually identified by the term "immigrant workers." They are less and less immigrants, despite the rise of ignorant and blind racism. This category of "Islam in France" is beginning a process which will turn it into "French Islam" over the next few decades.

### I - The Structures of Islam in France

#### 1 - The Legal Framework

Islam, like other religions practiced in France, is subject to the law of 8 December 1905 "concerning the separation of Churches and the State." It carries on its activities under the legal system of associations, as defined in Title IV of this law relating to cultural associations, or, most often, under the law of 1 July 1901, which grants freedom of association to all citizens, including foreign nationals.

Although the French Republic does not provide monetary support to any religion, nevertheless certain facilities have been made available, principally under pressure of population growth and the establishment of new cities and residential sections. (Among French Catholics, these facilities

are called "the cardinal's workshops.") It has been accepted that French communes provide land to cultural associations for only symbolic rents. Furthermore, the budget law of 29 July 1961 states, in Article 11: "In developing municipal areas, loans entered into by local groups or by cultural associations to finance the construction of buildings to meet collective needs of a religious character may be guaranteed by departments or communes. The minister of finance and economic affairs is also authorized to provide a state guarantee for loans made in France for the same purpose by national groups or associations." With regard to Islam, the practice has always rested on an interpretation of the term "developing municipal areas," extended to every commune which has a large community of Islamic origin and which has no place for them to hold religious services.

Table 1 - Muslims in France

Of Foreign Nationality	Of French Nationality
Algeria	780,000
Morocco	520,000
Tunisia	200,000
Turkey	165,000
Mali (90% Muslim)	24,340
Senegal (92% Muslim)	33,240
Cameroon (25% Muslim)	14,220
Ivory Coast (30% Muslim)	11,680
Mauritania	5,060
Pakistan	9,000
Shi'ites from Iran, Lebanon, 60,000 (?)	
Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan	-----
	Nearly 8.0 million
	Nearly 1.0 million
"French Muslims"	450,000
"Beurs"	400,000
Converts	100,000
Shi'ites (from Madagascar)	5,000

## 2 - Authority in the Islamic Religion and Community Organizations

Having no authoritative bodies or a hierarchy of organizations recognized by everyone, Islam in France, as is the case elsewhere and especially in Sunnite communities, is experiencing a kind of structural breakdown at the same time that it hears a constant appeal for the unity of the community of believers, founded on the consensus regarding its version of God and his revelation. The observer, therefore, should be aware of the various organizational networks which provide a structure to this community, networks which "are developing, one alongside the other, which are superimposed on each other, and which interact mutually." (Dassetto) (Footnote 1) (See the bibliography at the end of this article).

### 2.1 - International Muslim Organizations

Following the suppression of the Islamic Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk in 1924, the Muslim countries made several efforts to establish either a new kind of caliphate or a federal structure which would make it possible to encourage the solidarity and the unity of the Islamic world.

The World Islamic League (Rabitat al-alam al-islami), a non-governmental international organization, was established in Mecca in May 1962, at the initiative of Prince Faisal, in a context of internal tensions within the Arab-Muslim world between "progressives" who supported Gamal Abdel Nasser and "moderates" led by Saudi Arabia. Some 31 countries participated in the foundation of this organization and decided to make it a body whose mission was "to achieve the unity and the strengthening of the Muslim world, by fighting against elements which turn the believers away from their faith, by improving the quality of religious instruction, and by increasing the number of publications in the most widely used modern languages, while further expanding the use of Arabic among Muslims." A constituent council acts as the supreme organ of the league, and its secretary general is required to be a Saudi Arabian citizen.

In 1975 the league established a "Conseil superieur mondial des mosquées" [Higher World Council of Mosques], under which regional councils were organized on every continent. The Paris bureau of the league was opened in 1976. In June 1980 the "Conseil continental des mosquées en Europe" [Continental Council of Mosques in Europe] was established in Brussels, where it set up its headquarters. The Third Conference of the Continental Council, held in November 1982, decided on the establishment in Brussels of an Islamic Institute for the training of preachers and imams in Europe. The Paris bureau of the council was charged with organizing the "Conseil européen pour l'éducation islamique" [European Council for Islamic Education]. The London office of this council was assigned the task of establishing the "Academie européenne de jurisprudence islamique" [European Academy of Islamic Jurisprudence].

In addition to the distribution of Islamic catechisms and financial aid provided to mosques (4.5 million francs between 1979 and 1983, according to the league, of which 1.36 million francs were distributed in the year 1982-83 to 20 mosques), the league participates very substantially in the Islamic program broadcast every Sunday on TF 1 [French TV channel], through the association "Connaitre l'islam" [Knowing Islam]. Although it is controlled by Saudi Arabia, the league's activities are not limited to the spread of Wahhabi philosophy. No doubt the existence of a certain number of French converts to Islam makes it possible for the league to appreciate more effectively questions regarding the integration of the Muslim community in French society.

The "Ligue islamique" [Islamic League] is the only international Muslim organization presently in Paris. The "Organisation de la conférence islamique" [Islamic Conference Organization], whose headquarters are in Jidda, has no office in France. Only the London-based "Conseil islamique d'Europe" [Islamic Council of Europe], accused by its detractors of receiving support from Iran, in December 1984 established in Paris the "Secrétariat général pour les travailleurs musulmans en Europe" [General Secretariat for Muslim Workers in Europe].

## 2.2 - The Networks of Confraternities

The activities of Muslim confraternities (*tariqa*) are characterized by devotions to the holy founder of Islam on the occasion of visits to his tomb, by submission by the faithful to their sheiks, and by the holding of "dhikr," or "prayers from the heart" sessions. Based on Koranic law, the activities of

the confraternities are aimed at placing the believer and his god in "contact," thanks to the favorable influence of the sheik and the help of ecstatic dances and utterances. The networks established in this way are not just limited to the religious sphere but also extend to political and social life. Most of the present, larger confraternities claim that they were founded in the 12th and 13th centuries.

The very deep roots of the networks of confraternities in the Muslim world lead us to assume their existence in countries where Muslim immigrants have settled. The extent of their organization may vary, depending on the case. Strongly organized networks in their countries of origin (such as the Murids in Africa South of the Sahara) seem to have become better adapted in countries with Muslim immigrants than looser movements (the Tijani's, to speak only of black Muslims). In certain cases the network of confraternities has itself played a major role in the organization of emigration, which may be thought of in terms of a kind of pilgrimage or migration for the welfare of the community. Certain confraternities have even been able to regain a certain amount of dynamism in emigrant communities, providing communities which have broken down with a possibility of reorganizing and protecting themselves against the various forms of alleged aggression by western society, and the maintenance of customs and contacts with their country of origin (for example, the Isawiyya community, which was studied by Sossie Andezian). The interrelation between a confraternity and a nationality of origin, or, rather, an ethnic identity (but we would need more finely tuned research in this area) seems to be of great significance, in fact.

### 2.3 - Types of Islamic Associations

Despite the unanimous desire of the Muslims not only to transcend national boundaries in the name of the unity of the faith and not even to take such borders into account, nevertheless, Islam in France remains highly fragmented in terms of the borders between the various original nationalities and ethnic groups. Although attendance at religious services may at times deemphasize these differences, the composition of the numerous religious and cultural associations only confirms this tendency toward fragmentation. On the basis of a study of publicly identified associations in Paris which are interested in the religious life of Muslims, we can set down the following types of organizations.

--The first and very large category is made up of strictly religious associations identified as such, whose by-laws, in the great majority of cases, open their membership to all believers of good faith. However, certain associations include in their by-laws a kind of national exclusivism (for example, "Tendance nationale" [National Tendency Association], an Islamic union in France established in May 1979, which accepts only Turks as members).

--A second and much smaller category takes note of its national identity in a name which nevertheless is religious (such as the "Association islamique et cultuelle des marabouts senegalais" [Islamic and Religious Association of Senegalese Marabouts], set up in September 1984; almost all of the associations of "French Muslims" belong to this category and thus constitute a separate group.).

--Finally, a third category includes purely national and non-religious associations, to judge from their names, but which, in fact, are also involved in the operation of places for Muslim prayers (for example, "L'Amicale des travailleurs et commerçants marocains" [Association of Moroccan Workers and Businessmen], officially registered in February 1974, "L'Association de culture et d'entraide des travailleurs turcs" [The Turkish Workers' Association for Culture and Mutual Assistance], set up in July 1976, etc).

Although the last two categories do not hide their strictly national identity, many associations in the first category in fact have been built up around the core of a single group. At times this core involves a single country. This is the case with almost all of the Turkish associations, such as "L'Association Islamique en France" [The Islamic Association in France], registered in November 1983, and "Tendance nationale" [National Tendency], an Islamic union registered in May, 1979. The officers of the association, "Vivre l'islam en Occident" [Living Islam in the West], registered in December 1984, are exclusively French converts. "L'Association des musulmans de France" [The Association of French Muslims], registered in April 1974, is composed only of French of Algerian origin. "La Mission islamique mondiale" [The World Islamic Mission], registered in September 1982, consists only of Pakistani. In most cases, this core is multinational, involving people from the Maghreb or Africa South of the Sahara. (To all appearances, these involve a single ethnic community.) However, in these groups a single nationality is much larger than the others: "L'Association cultuelle musulmane" [The Muslim Religious Association] was registered in November 1980 by 23 Mauritians, seven Malians, two Senegalese, two Ivorians, and two French of African origin. "L'Association cultuelle islamique" [The Islamic Religious Association], registered in June 1969, includes among its 1979 officers eight Algerians, one Tunisian, and one Moroccan. Even an association like "Foi et pratique" [Faith and Practice], registered in September 1972 and known for including groups of several nationalities, included among its officers most recently and publicly listed in Paris 16 Algerians, five Tunisians, three Moroccans, one Senegalese, etc.

The only associations which we have found in Paris where there is a clear desire to include all nationalities are made up of "elite" groups, whether these are associations directly relates to the major national organizations or associations of the liberal professions. The association "Connaitre l'islam," registered in March 1983 and intended to broadcast a religius program on TF 1 on Sunday morning, has figures from all countries on its board of directors, including ambassadors, university professors, jurists, or senior civil servants. "L'Association des medecins musulmans de France" [The Association of Muslim Doctors of France], registered in July 1982, under the auspices of the Paris Mosque, as well as "L'Association des etudiants islamiques" [The Association of Islamic Students], registered in September 1963, draw their officers from all nationalities. Recently established Islamic associations covering all of France (see above) have tried to recruit officers of various nationalities. However, up to the present they have not succeeded in overcoming the deepest kind of national cleavages.

Many members of these associations seem to belong to the first generation of immigrants, with their children prefering cultural and sports associations.

Women are absent from almost all of these associations, with the exception, of course, of "L'Union française des femmes musulmanes et de leurs amies" [French Union of Muslim Women and Their Friends] and its related groups. Some converts are also officers of "Vivre l'islam en Occident" or "Islam et Occident" [Islam and the West]. At times, husbands and wives are officers of the same organizations, such as "L'Association unie divine" [The Divine Unity Association], registered in December 1982, or "Mouvement islamique Khadrya" [The Khadrya Islamic Movement].

Almost all of these associations are made up of working class and manual workers. It is appropriate to note that even the least favored groups, most often illiterate, organize themselves and establish associations. An association such as "Regroupement islamique des hamalistes en France" [The Islamic Group of Hamalists of France] has a majority of street sweepers on its board of directors, and the same is true of "L'Association cultuelle musulmane."

To national identification is sometimes added allegiance to this or that government or opposition political party in their countries of origin, an allegiance which is necessarily denied in their by-laws, in accordance with the requirements of the Law of 1901. Among the Turkish associations we find the whole political spectrum of their country of origin represented. This comment could also be applied to the Maghrebian associations in a general way. The African blacks would seem to have escaped from this phenomenon, leaving the political field to political associations and organizing the religious sector on an ethnic or confraternity basis, thus going beyond the borders inherited from the colonial period.

#### 2.3.1 - The Maghrebian Muslims

Algeria has always tried to exercise its authority over all of the Muslim community in France. In doing that it has relied on history, on the number of its citizens (who constitute a substantial stake for its own future), and the senior rank of the Paris mosque, which Algeria has been able to dominate.

#### The Algerians

"L'Amicale des Algériens en Europe" [The Association of Algerians in Europe] is a direct expression of the FLN [National Liberation Front]. Above all, it is interested in politics. The association only very rarely is involved in the daily life of its members. For example, it does not seem to organize any activities during Muslim holidays, leaving the way open in this area to institutions depending on the Paris mosque. Those opposed to the Algerian Government, organized around Ben Bella, who advocates a return to religion, express themselves through the "Mouvement de la démocratie en Algérie" [Movement for Democracy in Algeria] and its newspaper, AL-BADIL, a periodical published in Arabic and French. It was impossible for us to evaluate their influence on religious foundations.

#### The Alawiyya

The Algerians are also organized according to their membership in confraternities, despite a loss of momentum on the part of the mystic

organizations in the Maghreb, to the benefit of religious associations of all kinds. The Alawiyia is the best known confraternity in France. This association draws its name from Sheik Ahmad ibn Mustafa al-Alawi, its founder (who lived in Mostaganem, Algeria, 1869-1934). It is a part of the tradition of the Darqawiyya confraternity, which goes back to Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhuli, its founder (Tunis, beginning of the 13th century). Established in 1921, this confraternity expanded very quickly spread throughout the Maghreb, not to mention Paris, where a branch was set up in 1924. It organized itself as "L'Association des amis de l'islam" [Association of the Friends of Islam] in 1949, under the presidency of Adda Bentounes (1898-1952), the successor to Sheik al-Alawi. Its headquarters were in Drancy. Khaled Bentounes, his grandson, is now the leader of the association, which is well known for the substantial number of French converts among its members.

Among the other confraternities on which some studies have been made, we might mention the Isawiyya, founded by Sheikh Mohammed Ben Issa from Western Algeria. It is one of the few Islamic confraternities to recruit women members.

#### The Muslim Institute and the Paris Mosque

The establishment in Paris of the Muslim Institute constituted the first "official" recognition of Islam by the French Republic, in appreciation for the 300,000 to 500,000 Muslims who came from North Africa and Africa South of the Sahara to fight on the Somme and in Champagne during World War I, where many died. A law was approved on 19 August 1920, granting a credit to the "Societe des habous des lieux saints de l'islam" [Society of Habous of the Holy Places of Islam]. Presided over by the chief of protocol of the sultan of Morocco, it was organized with seven active members. (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia each provided two representatives, while Senegal provided one.) The building was dedicated in 1926 by Moulay Youssef, the sultan of Morocco.

Si Hamza Boubakeur, deputy for the oases, was appointed rector of the institute in 1957 by Prime Minister Guy Mollet and served until his resignation in 1982. At first his position was challenged by all of the countries of the Maghreb. (Algeria called him a traitor, while Morocco and Tunisia denounced the Algerian stranglehold on the institute.) Si Hamza was reconciled with Algeria toward the end of the 1960's. At the time of his resignation in 1982, under juridical conditions challenged by French Muslims, he turned the mosque over to the Algerian Government, which appointed Sheik Abbas, the present rector. Since this appointment the Paris mosque has enjoyed substantial aid from the Algerian Government, which is presently financing major work on the restoration of its buildings and an expansion of the hall of prayers to increase its capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 people.

The Paris mosque has various forms of activity. In the religious area it presides over decisions on the calendar of holidays and the hours of prayer. A religious tribunal gives decisions on Muslim affairs. A program of instruction is available to persons wishing to convert to Islam, as well as for Muslim children. The mosque carries on or coordinates a certain number of charitable, social, and religious activities (prison chaplains, boy scouts, etc) and tries to add a large number of associations to its network of "associated mosques" in the provinces of France.

In effect, the Paris mosque tries to present itself as the spokesman for the Muslims in France. Certainly, it is the representative most usually contacted by the government, and the president of France presents his best wishes to the rector of the institute and through him to the Muslim community on the occasion of religious holidays. The Paris mosque has also obtained the support of the "French Muslims," who were well received initially by Si Hamza Boubakeur, the former rector, and who are now reconciled to Algeria to some extent. However, the minister of the interior has always refused to grant the Paris mosque exclusive authority over ritual slaughter of animals, considering that the mosque is not sufficiently representative of the Muslim community.

In effect, the claims of Algeria have always been challenged by the other Maghrebian countries. The Moroccans, in particular, have denounced Algerian control of the Paris mosque, recalling that the mosque was controlled from its establishment and until 1954 by the chief of protocol of the sultan of Morocco. The Turks, in general, ignore this "Arab" institution, and a considerable number of Muslim blacks prefer their networks of confraternities to it. Despite these challenges and boycotts, the Paris mosque remains a kind of symbol of Islam in France, which it tries to unit around it in a great "Islamic assembly" (see above).

#### The Moroccans

Among Moroccan residents of France two principal associations compete for the support of the community. "L'Amicale des travailleurs et des commerçants marocains," which is closely related to the Moroccan Government, manages a large number of mosques throughout France. "L'Association des Marocains en France" [The Association of Moroccans in France], which is close to the opposition to the government, claims to be very active in the daily life of the community, contrary to its Algerian opposite number.

The Derkawa confraternity, founded in the 19th century and very active throughout Morocco, no doubt has a network of supporters in France. However, we have not succeeded in obtaining information on this subject.

#### The Tunisians

The Tunisian community seems to be little organized in terms of "Official Islam." The religious opposition to the regime of President Bourguiba, such as the MTA (Movement of the Islamic Tendency), is the flag bearer around Sheik Ghannouchi. It carries on a considerable level of activity. The GIF (Islamic Group in France), organized on 14 March 1980, reportedly has a federal structure with the northern part of France for its center of gravity. In terms of presently existing groups, the GIF belongs to "L'Union des organisations islamiques en France" [The Union of Islamic Organizations in France], whose headquarters is in Amiens and which includes about 15 associations throughout the country. Moreover, it has joined "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France" [National Federation of French Muslims (see above)]. The president of the GIF is the vice president of the federation.

### 2.3.2 - The Black Muslims

The black Muslims, while maintaining some distance from Maghrebian associations, do not refuse to attend services at the same mosques. Those most disposed to an understanding with the Maghrebians belong to movements inspired by the Wahhabi sect and are found throughout Mali, for example. These groups, which are active, according to Jacques Barou, but have not yet been studied in any detail, reportedly are in contact with the Saudi Arabian Embassy. No doubt they are a minority, but the "Federation nationale des musulmans de France," which is close to the Islamic League and Saudi Arabia, recognizes the unwillingness of associations of black Muslims to affiliate with it.

The black Muslims are particularly known for having considerably developed the marabout system, in some cases mixing it with various animist practices. Many black Muslim religious centers operate in France. The Senegalese Murids are the most active and the best known of these groups.

#### The Murids

The Murid sect began its life in the Wolof area of Senegal. It was founded in 1886 by Ahmadou Bamba (1852?-1927). This confraternity was based on three principles: love and obedience by man toward God, a desire to travel toward God by fighting against our shortcomings, and working for the good of the community. The last principle characterizes the confraternity, which makes work the equivalent of prayer if people perform it by order of the marabouts. For their part the marabouts take on themselves all of the religious duties of their disciples, the talibes.

The Murid sect, which is linked to Wolof culture, began to develop in France with the massive immigration of Senegalese which took place shortly after independence was achieved. In Paris this activity is based on two principal groups: street merchants who sell bracelets and statues and who have lived until recently on Chalon Island, as well as students living in the "Poniatowski" student residence.

In 1974 "L'Association des etudiants et stagiaires mourides en France" [The Association of Murid Students and Trainees in Europe] began the publication of N'DIGEL, described as "The Voice of the Murid." This brought the association out of a semi-clandestine existence. In 1983 "L'Association internationale d'aide et de diffusion du mouridisme" [The International Association for the Support and Spread of Muridism] was established in Paris, with the objectives of bringing non-Senegalese Mourides out of their life in the shadows, undertaking "a dialogue of cultures, helping and assisting persons in distress, helping them to resettle themselves and to resume their true place in their own surroundings and clarifying the examples and teachings of the great humanists of the world: Ghandi and Sheik Ahmadou Bamba." This association undertakes missionary activity in the Beaubourg section of Paris.

#### The Marabouts and Other Members of Confraternities

"Le Regroupement islamique des hamalistes en France," which was established in April 1976, most of whose officers are Malians, venerates the memory of Sheik

Sherif Ahamada Hamaloulak (who died in 1942). It has retained nothing of the Muslim profession of faith except the existence of one God, abandoning the prophecies of Muhammad, as well as prayers toward Mecca. (These have been replaced by prayers toward Nyoro.) "Le Mouvement islamique Khadrya" (Islamic Khadrya Movement) has also been functioning since July 1983.

Beside these known and organized confraternities a certain number of "travelling marabouts" actively seek supporters both among the immigrant population as well as among people of French origin (this open activity characterizes them.). To these potential supporters they speak of all kinds of magical and religious activity (the healing of physical or mental suffering, sorcery, etc). Here we are at the crossroads of traditional African practices, Muslim esotericism, the western taste for exotic esotericism, and the exploitation of individual and collective distress. These "marabouts" do not depend directly on Muslim confraternities but use a wholly Islamic approach to things. According to "Accueil et promotion" [the Welcome and Promotion association] mentioned by Durand, there are about 460 marabouts in Paris, some three-quarters of whom are in the 18th District alone.

"L'Association islamique et cultuelle des marabouts senegalais en France" [The Islamic and Religious Association of Senegalese Marabouts in France] was registered in September 1984 for the purpose of "bringing together the Senegalese working at their profession (sic) as marabouts in France; developing friendly relations among its members through the establishment of a welfare fund intended to provide assistance to social cases and to finance religious ceremonies; and facilitating relations between the Senegalese and French authorities."

#### 2.3.3 - The Turkish Muslims

The Turks live in France in a very significant state of isolation. On the one hand this is a linguistic type of isolation, as the majority of them speak French very badly and have no knowledge of Arabic, the principal language of the Muslim immigrants. It is also a social form of isolation, due to their refusal to mix with other Muslims. In effect, in all of the cases studied, the Turkish community has provided itself with its own prayer and meeting places, refusing to share them with Maghrebians, for example.

Several organizational networks provide a structure to this community. They are characterized by political, ethnic, or even confraternity allegiances, all of which may interact. Although modern Turkey is based on an unbending form of laicism resulting from the reforms of Kemal Ataturk, its historic evolution since the 1950's has made religion an element in political party struggle, and this reality may be observed as clearly in Turkish immigrant communities abroad as in Turkey itself. Almost all of the Turkish political forces have a corresponding association in France.

The Turkish Government carries on continuous activity among the Turkish community and has assigned about 125 teachers to France. These teachers have been recognized by the French Ministry of National Education to teach the Turkish language and culture in Turkish schools.

Beside this official structure Turkish associations abound. Gaye Salom estimates that there are more than 200 of them throughout France. In Paris there is "Culture et entraide des travailleurs turcs" [The Turkish Workers Association for Culture and Mutual Assistance], registered in July 1976. This is known as the spokesman of the Turkish Government to some extent, which carefully supports the concept of laicism while cultivating great respect for religion. "L'Union islamique en France," which was registered in December 1984, reportedly supports the ideas of Erbakkan, founder of the former Party of National Salvation. This association, which supports the Islamicization of Turkish public life, seems to be fairly well represented throughout the French provinces. It is characterized by its defense of free enterprise and a certain kind of work ethic and very often carries on its activities through a network of grocery stores and small business firms, with the office behind the stores serving as a prayer and meeting room. The "L'Association des travailleurs turcs idealistes de Paris" [Association of Idealistic Turkish Workers of Paris], registered in February 1978, reportedly supports the extremist ideas of Turkes. Saudi Arabia and the universalist services of Islam, which are associated with it, reportedly provide assistance to "L'Association islamique en France" [The Islamic Association in France], which was registered in November 1983. The Turkish community in the French provinces seems more structured around religion (and sports) than it is in Paris, where it is more politicized. In the provinces the teaching of the Turkish language often goes hand in hand with the teaching of religion. A large number of "school and parents" associations reportedly are the objects of efforts to bring them under control by certain Islamic movements.

The confraternities, which are very active in Turkey in spite of having been officially proscribed, also provide a certain structure to the Turkish community in France, although clandestinely, in view of the risks faced in Turkey. The Alevi Shi'ites, who are relatively more numerous in France than in Turkey and are often Kurds, are organized in political associations and in confraternities. The Naqshbendiyya, one of the confraternities, was for a long time a center of opposition to the ideas of Kemal Ataturk before it moved closer to the Democratic Party of Menderes and then to the pro-Islamic party Erbakkan, of which it is one of the pillars. It is quite possible that the confraternity is close to "L'Union islamique en France", as both of them have connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, whose supreme leader lives in exile in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Bektashi, who claim to be supporters of Haji Bektash (14th century), preach a doctrine close to that of the Alevi, and it is quite probable that some people belong to both organizations. Other modern confraternities, which appeared in the course of the struggle against Kemal Ataturk, are active in Turkey and reportedly are being organized in France. These include the Sulavmancilar group, established by Sulayman Hilmi Tunalihan (died in 1959) and the Nurdchuluk, established by Said Nusi (died in 1960).

#### 2.3.4 - The Influence of Libya

Although its role may have been depicted in exaggerated form and it may have been represented as supporting international terrorism, Libya has not been inactive in the Islamic immigrant community in France. Its activities are

coordinated by the "Comite de la vocation islamique" [Committee of Islamic Vocation], established in Tripoli in May 1972 and intended "to preach the Islamic faith to the peoples of all parts of the world and to train Muslims for the preaching of Islam." The association is also interested in the teaching of the Arabic language. "L'Union des associations islamiques en France" [The Union of Islamic Associations in France], established in February 1982 around the mosque in Mantes-la-Jolie, which is related to this committee, reportedly includes about 15 associations, which have not been able really to expand its influence. The committee publishes RISALAT AL-JIHAD (The Letter of the Jihad), a monthly magazine published in Arabic, English, and French. The publication concerns both Islam, as well as science, technical matters, and modern society. Col Qadhafi, the "guide of the Libyan revolution," has no connection with any kind of Islamic fundamentalism in this connection. Certainly, the committee advocates a return to the Koran but after abandoning the tradition of exegesis and jurisprudence considered outmoded and alleged to be guilty of divine pretensions by seeking to legitimize a reputedly divine authority. The committee urges the adoption of a form of Islam which dares to make a revolution by itself and become a world force which will challenge the division of the world between the two super powers. It allegedly seeks to do this for the benefit of the exploited Third World, whose liberation will thus come from the Arab nation. This rejection of traditional Muslim authorities, those of the past as well as those of the present, perhaps explains the reluctance of a large number of the Muslim faithful to follow the Qadhafi line.

### 2.3.5 - The Shi'ites of Iran

It seems that theological, ethnic, linguistic, and political cleavages stand in the way of the establishment of any overall organization for the Shi'ites themselves. However, Mehdi Rouhani, an Iranian born in Qum, represents himself as the leader of the Shi'ite community in Europe. Now resident in France for the past 20 years, for the past few years he has made sharp, verbal attacks against the policies of Ayatollah Khomeyni (see interview in LIBERATION of 23 September 1981, LA VIE of 22 December 1983, and LE MONDE of 4 January 1984.). Rouhani directed "Le Centre islamique iranien de Paris" [The Iranian Islamic Center of Paris] for a long time. He founded it about 20 years ago, before leaving it when it became an instrument for the spread of the ideas of the Iranian Islamic Republic. His influence appears to be limited to the present Iranian opposition.

For its part the Iranian Embassy undertakes a certain amount of activity, having replaced "Le Centre islamique iranien de Paris" on the Rue Jean-Bart after it was closed by the French Government in December 1983.

In any case, Iranian preaching activity goes well beyond the ranks of the Shi'ites. It affects a certain number of Sunni Muslims who, although they have not adopted the Shi'ite faith, are fascinated by the boldness of this form of Islam, which is traditional and modern at the same time. Thus, the Iranian revolution feeds an Islamic ideology of pride and claims, going beyond even national and theological divisions. A small number of French citizens of French origin have also been affected by this form of preaching, and, after they were converted to Islam, have been able to visit Iran.

Iran is not the only country to be active on the Shi'ite scene in France. Lebanese developments over the past few years have led to an expansion in the number of political groups represented in France. The Amal Shi'ite movement and its supporters carry on a certain level of activity which, however, has strictly political connotations and which is aimed only at the Lebanese community.

In the religious field a library for ancient manuscripts was established at the beginning of the 1980's in the Kremlin-Bicetre area of Paris. According to Raymond Delval, its organizers are Arab speaking Shi'ites from Iraq and Lebanon. They have set up an association called "Ahl el-Beit" ("the people of the house of the prophet," that is, the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the Shi'ite imams) in 1985. The association publishes a periodical called AHL EL-BEIT in Paris, and has issued a certain number of small pamphlets both in Arabic and French on statements coming from Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'ites. Some prayer manuals have also been translated into French.

AL-MUNTAKA is a magazine published in French, English, and Arabic. Over the past several years it has been the spokesman of the Sunni Muslims who support the Iranian revolution. The bulk of the articles are signed by Middle Easterners, but we may also find there translations of Maudoudi, the founder of the activist Pakistani element, and of Ghanouchi, the leader of the Tunisian MTI.

#### 2.3.6 - The 'French Muslims'

Although they are known under the generic name of "French Muslims," the community of former harkis [North Africans who served in the French Army] has never known how to organize itself or has been unable to do so. Some 250 associations, located in about 30 French departments, try to advance the interests of this or that group, clan, or family, but there are only a few of them which have any real number of members and influence. According to Veyne-Sanchez, only two associations can pretend to have some claim to represent this group: "Le Front national des rapatries français de confession islamique" [The National Front of French Repatriates of the Islamic Faith] and "La Confédération des Français musulmans rapatriés et leurs amis" [The Confederation of Repatriated French Muslims and Their Friends]. "La Convention nationale des Français musulmans" [The Convention of French Muslims] was established in February 1984 "to coordinate the activities of the associations of French Muslims, with a view to working for national unity, progress, and justice." This kind of association seeks above all to defend the economic and political interests of its members. Many small associations have been established elsewhere and administer the mosques used by the harkis. The relations with Si Hamza Boubakeur and the recent policy carried out by Algeria and Sheik Abbas convinced these associations of the usefulness of belonging to "Le Rassemblement islamique" [The Islamic Rally] organized around the Paris mosque. Sheik Abbas is rather frequently active in resolving various problems affecting the activities in Algeria of the children of the harkis

#### 2.3.7 - The French Converts

The French converts to Islam come from highly varied backgrounds and are not members of well defined organizations. However, the organization "Vivre l'islam en Occident," which was registered in Paris in December 1984, has the

objective of "bringing together westerners who have joined the Islamic faith, as well as their descendants" and "to provide for those who become Muslims an initial contact with the Islamic community." The association aims at "combining our efforts to establish favorable conditions for the growth of authentic Islamic values in and around us" and "encouraging by all available means instruction in Muslim doctrine, principles, and rituals, while taking into account the manner of thought of western minds." Its founder is Yacoub Roty, who is also president of "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France." This kind of association, which is an outgrowth of the thinking of Rene Guenon, seeks to act as a bridge between Europe and Islam and refuses to fall into the use of extremist language which are impenetrable to the West. We may also find many French converts to Islam in the organizations "Connaitre l'islam", "L'Islam et l'Occident," or even "Les Amis de l'islam" [The Friends of Islam].

#### 2.4 - Associative Groups

The Muslim community has made several attempts aimed at resolving its national division into splinter groups by establishing a single structure intended to become both the official spokesman of the community with the government and the unquestioned spokesman of all of its members. However, no association, federation, or assembly of groups has succeeded in emerging above the others and overcoming existing divisions. The Turks in general and the blacks, in many cases, remain outside these groupings. The remainder of the Islamic community, whose majority is made up of Muslims of Maghrebian origin to whom have been added a few other nationalities, is presently divided up between, on the one hand, the Paris mosque, which is known for its contacts with Algeria, and, on the other hand, "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France," which was established in association with the World Islamic League.

##### 2.4.1 - The Higher Council of Islamic Affairs

In 1981 Si Hamza Boubakeur, then rector of the Paris mosque, tried to establish "Le Conseil superieur des affaires islamiques en France" [The Higher Council of Islamic Affairs in France (majlis)]. The effort failed in view of the attitude of many communities which, while recognizing the urgency of the questions under consideration and the need to provide positive answers for them, refused to follow the rector.

##### 2.4.2 - The Islamic Consistory of France

A short-lived proposal to establish "Le Consistoire islamique de France" [The Islamic Consistory of France] was considered in May 1984, in opposition to the Paris mosque and at the initiative of Mohamed Belmekki, a former French non-commissioned officer of Algerian origin. It was too much an individual effort and marked by the past. It did not succeed, and Belmekki returned to anonymity.

##### 2.4.3 - The Islamic Rally and the National Federation

Two other efforts at regrouping Islamic organizations have been made since 1985. On 27 April 1985 the Paris mosque organized "Le Rassemblement islamique" [The Islamic Rally] in Lille to study arrangements for an improved

integration of Islam in French society, putting an end to the dispersion of the Muslim community. The idea of establishing a Higher Islamic Council came up once again.

Starting from the same recognition of the divisions in the Muslim community in France, other associations also decided to respond to this proposal, but by fixing responsibility on "nationalist influences," and denouncing "the under handed struggle for hegemony" to which the community was subjected. These Islamic associations met on 26 October 1985 at the Palais des Congres in Paris and decided to establish a federation which came into existence on 30 November under the name of "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France" (al-Jami'a al-qawmiyya li-muslimi Fransa).

The president of this federation is Yacoub Roty, a French citizens whose parents were converted to Islam. He is also president of "Vivre l'islam en Occident." The "Ligue islamique mondiale" is accused by the detractors of the federation of having been the moving body in its establishment, with Roty himself working in its Paris office. Roty claims to have the support of about 170 Islamic associations spread out throughout France. He himself estimates the total number of these associations at about 500. Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians, and French citizens reportedly support the federation, whereas the black are said to have remained out of it, while the Algerians have boycotted it.

The Paris mosque reacted sharply to the establishment of this federation, accusing it of misunderstanding the mosque's role of representing and unifying the Muslim community in France, which it considered only natural. It called for the establishment of a new Islamic Rally, whose first meeting was held in Lyon, this time on 14 December 1985. Some 5,000 Muslims participated in this meeting, including many personalities who came from various Muslim countries.

According to Sheik Guessoum, its vice rector, the Islamic Rally organized around the Paris mosque, reportedly includes 300 associations of all nationalities. The immense majority of them are of Algerian origin, either as Algerian citizens or French Muslims born in Algeria. Although the Paris mosque seems, in effect, to have failed in part in its effort to expand its influence beyond the Algerian community, in any case it achieved a kind of reconciliation among the sons of Algeria who had been divided by the Algerian independence war. In this connection Sheik Abbas only continued the efforts of Si Hamza. However, the suggestion made in Lyon to establish a Higher Islamic Council was considered premature and has not led to anything up to now.

#### 2.4.4 - The 'Faith and Practice' Organization

A single movement of some importance, including Maghrebian immigrants and others, refuses to join either the Islamic Rally around the Paris mosque or the National Federation of French Muslims. This is the "Foi et pratique" group, affiliated to the Jamaat Tabligh wa Dawa of Pakistan (an assembly for preaching and mobilization). Founded by Mawlana Muhammad Iliyas (1885-1944) and solidly organized in the New Delhi region, this movement has flourished in the Muslim world, thanks to its characteristic network of preachers. In effect, the group insists on the need for a simple and demanding type of

religious initiation, centered on the profession of the faith and giving priority simultaneously to the interior life of the soul and the public practice of the faith (the men wear beards and jellabas and the women wear scarves and a long garment; they participate in public prayers.). This is done to make an impression and to encourage those who have fallen away from the true faith to return to its practice. It is the duty of each of its members to devote a certain number of hours, days, and months during their lives to work as itinerant preachers.

The French Section of the Tabligh was registered in Paris in September 1972. At the request of the government, it gave up its idea of calling itself the Association of Good Morals and adopted the name "Foi et pratique." At present this association reportedly includes about 30 subsidiary groups and operates three mosques in Paris. Although it is resolutely "internationalist," its most recent Board of Directors registered in Paris includes a very large majority of Algerians (16), compared to five Tunisians, three Moroccans, and one Senegalese. Its president is Sheik Mohammed Hammami, a Tunisian. Since 1977 the association has owned the Chateau de Villemain in Grisy (Department of Seine-et-Marne) and intends to establish a teaching center there.

Contacts with other Muslim communities throughout the world are maintained through the exchange of itinerant preachers. The members of the Tabligh carry on their activities, both in the mosques which they control, as well as in all other places of prayer; and through the sending of "missionaries" who preach when the time comes for sermons or at the end of prayers, as provided for by the tradition of hospitality due to men with religious knowledge. They also carry on their activities in cafes, movie theaters, and business firms frequented by Muslims, where they denounce the abandonment of religious practice.

This activism has met with some reticence on the part of the Paris mosque, which supports more discretion and tolerance. This movement, which has achieved a certain expansion in the last few years, has reportedly added few new recruits recently.

## II - Religious Practice

No systematic study is yet available regarding the Muslim profession of faith and level of religious practice in France. Following the analysis of Sossie Andezian (1986), it is appropriate to distinguish between religious practices of an individual character (daily prayers and food and purification practices), family practices (circumcision, marriage, death, and the return from the pilgrimage to Mecca), and community practices (Friday prayers during the middle of the day; prayers during Ramadan, Aid al-Saghir, and Aid al-Kabir; and the pilgrimage to Mecca), not to mention so-called "popular" practices in connection with the activities of confraternities (for example, dhikr [prayer] meetings).

### 1. - Individual Practices

For the most part, daily prayers are in private (at least as far as the women are concerned), and, given the present state of our knowledge, it is

impossible for us to estimate the extent of individual practice of the Muslim faith in figures. The only study which we have seen a reference to (by Camilleri, mentioned by Sammut; we have not been able to find a copy of the original) compares the attitude of parents and children in the Maghreb. It reports that, although 97 percent of the fathers said they are Muslims, only 73 percent of the young people still claimed this religious affiliation. (Some 30 percent of the young Algerians admitted they had lost their faith, compared to 25 percent of the young Moroccans and 20 percent of the young Tunisians.) About 48 percent of the parents still observe daily prayers, compared to only 3 percent of the children. About 45 percent of the parents state that they still read the Koran, compared to 13 percent of the children. It seems apparent that emigration, by initially relieving social pressures, has involved a certain abandonment of the daily practice of prayers.

Prohibitions on certain foods, relating as much to culture as to religion, seem to be very generally respected, particularly as far as the consumption of pork is concerned, but including alcoholic beverages as well, at least among the working class elements. However, some changes have occurred, with some of those queried consuming prohibited foods in canteens at places of work, while observing the prohibition at home. The increase in the number of religious abattoirs over the past few years would tend to confirm a desire to continue to observe the regulations on food. According to the Camilleri study, some 95 percent of the parents observe the prohibition on the consumption of pork and alcoholic beverages, compared to 69 percent of the young people.

## 2. Family Practices

Family practices, which tend to strengthen relationships, both among those living abroad and between those living abroad and their country of origin, are closely followed. In many cases these practices are common in the country of birth, at least as far as marriage and circumcision are concerned. The return from the pilgrimage to Mecca is the occasion for extensive celebrations with neighbors. At the time of death many families spent substantial amounts of money arranging for the return of the remains to "Muslim soil." Moreover, a type of insurance has been proposed to facilitate this practice. The Muslim custom of burying the dead with their heads in the direction of Mecca is not always possible in French cemeteries, which is a further motivation for the desire to return the remains to a Muslim country. Until recently, the Muslim cemetery in Bobigny took care of the needs of the Muslim community in the Paris area. However, it is now almost filled. Certain cities have now set out a Muslim section in their cemeteries.

## 3. Community Practices

The great festival of the sacrifice of a sheep, at the close of the week of pilgrimage, no doubt remains the high point of the Muslim year and the most often mentioned identifying sign of Muslim orientation, as the studies by Bruno Etienne show. Many families contribute to buying a living sheep and then slaughter it according to the Muslim rite, under semi-clandestine circumstances. Depending on the customs of the country, the festival is also an occasion for gatherings among families dispersed throughout the country and among the residents of the same building or residential section. According to Camilleri's study, some 95 percent of the parents celebrate the festival.

festivals. The rate of celebration by young people is about 76 percent, the highest level of positive responses in this study. However, Bruno Etienne particularly noted the total ignorance of young people regarding the religious significance of these festivals, which have become sociological occasions.

The observation of Ramadan is also a powerful sign of identity. A great majority of the immigrants respect the daytime fast, despite difficulties related to work requirements. Social pressure plays a role difficult to evaluate in this connection. However, it is certain that a large number of Muslims who have little respect for daily prayers nevertheless observe Ramadan. According to Camilleri, some 93 percent of the parents observe the fast, compared to 42 percent of the young people. All social life is transformed during Ramadan, with community activity postponed until night time, when it is full of conviviality and festive meals.

The pilgrimage to Mecca, with the increases in the cost of transportation, is of concern to only a minority. In 1985 4,000 pilgrims reportedly left France for the Muslim Holy Land by air or in special buses, compared to 6,000 in 1982 (see LIBERATION of 13 August 1985).

The practice of collective prayer has not yet been studied in statistical terms. According to Bruno Etienne (March 1985), less than 10 percent of the Muslims participate in public prayers on Friday in France. (Marseille has about 4,000 places in the mosque for a population of 150,000 Muslims.) On the other hand, we have rather precise studies concerning the situation in Belgium. According to Dassetto, on the average, 6 to 8 percent of the total Muslim population attends services at the mosque on Fridays. Those attending include, in the first place, adult men (who make up 28 percent of the population), with a rate of attendance almost equal among the Turks and men from the Maghreb. Between 2 and 3 percent of those attending Friday services at the mosque are women.

This masculine aspect of collective prayers (accentuated during the pilgrimage to Mecca) may also be observed in France for reasons unrelated to immigration as such. Because of various prohibitions concerning the segregation of the sexes, the role of women in Islam is much more concerned with private religious life. This should not be interpreted here in only the individual sense of the word (for certainly, there are many women who pray at home.) but also in the sense of collective religious practices by women in the home. In many studies bearing on the "social networks of immigrant, Maghrebian women in southern France," Andesian has shown very clearly the great frequency of this kind of religious meetings, often conducted in connection with the rites of the confraternities. Andesian has also brought out the fundamental role of women and their neighborhood networks in the establishment of organizations which carry on ritual practices (women who wash the bodies of the dead, religious singing groups, etc) and in reminding the men and the whole family of everything dealing with the communication and application of religious practices.


#### 4. Religious Establishments

The construction of mosques and places of prayer in Muslim immigrant communities is a recent phenomenon. For a long time the Paris mosque was the

only one in France with that name, although a few, temporary places of prayer were open here and there. It was necessary to wait until the end of the 1960's to see the beginning of the process of construction of public religious centers. Since that time we have seen the progressive structuralization of the Islamic faith in France, the increased demand for religious ceremonies, the near abandonment of any idea of returning to their countries of origin in the case of many immigrants, the possibility offered to foreigners of establishing their own associations and the various forms of aid provided by French charitable or public organizations, Muslim states, and supra-national Islamic organizations. As a result, the number of places of prayer (mosques, prayer rooms, simple shrines, and Islamic centers) has continued to increase. Although this tendency has been clearly evident, the relevant figures have been a matter of controversy, up to now.

Following a certain amount of research, we have concluded that the total number of Muslim places of prayer, in the broadest sense of the word, was 941 as of the end of 1985, with the annual and geographic breakdown as follows.


Year	Centers	Other Places	Total
1976	93	38	131
1977	109	53	162
1978	125	72	197
1979	157	107	264
1980	178	144	322
1981	197	180	377
1982	212	239	451
1983	228	292	520
1984	234	344	578
1985	238	381	619
No Date	187	135	322
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>425</b>	<b>516</b>	<b>941</b>



Although these figures appear to be accurate, we cannot pretend that they are precisely correct. For example, we made a census of 59 places of prayer in the Department of Bouches-du-Rhone. For the Marseille municipal area alone Bruno Etienne lists 18 places of prayer which might be considered mosques and 80 to 100 other places of prayer in caves and in apartment buildings (see "Les temps modernes" [Modern Times], March 1984, p 1620). Our figures cover places of prayer which might be considered permanent and open to all persons, whether they involve rooms in homes or factories or shrines and mosques belonging to publicly registered associations. We may consider that in areas with large Muslim populations these figures are certainly underestimated, in the sense that, beside these places of prayer which have some kind of official status, there is a very large number of meeting places which are eventually used for religious purposes, in apartments, caves, or in rooms behind stores. The chronological curve above clearly shows a steady increase in the number of places of prayer established. We were unable to go back to the period before 1976 and obtain precise figures. There is reason to believe that this increase began in about 1972. Although these centers very broadly benefited

from the opening of these places of prayer in a major way (there also in accordance with a regular curve), they reached the point of being properly equipped at the beginning of the 1980's, with 1983 marking a period of near stagnation. It was in 1981 that the curve recording the establishment of places of prayer outside the home passed the curve of places of prayer within workers' residences and reflected a very substantial increase. The general increase in the size of the immigrant population which had abandoned any intention of returning to their countries of origin and the growing trend toward family reunion in France can explain this acceleration. The possibility once again offered to foreigners of freely establishing associations among themselves no doubt played an encouraging role in this process. However, the demand for religious services played the principal role.

Number of Places of Prayer by Department  
(1985)



4.1 - Places of Prayer in Centers for Workers

With the increase in immigration, the French Government, at the beginning of the 1960's, developed a network of residential centers for workers throughout France, managed either by public organizations (SONACOTRA) or by semi-public or private associations (ADEF, AFTAM, SOUNDIATA, ASSOTRAF, etc). Most of these centers were intended for the use of bachelors. The increase in family immigration led to the "takeover" of entire residential areas, outside these workers' ghettos.

By the middle of the 1970's, when there were many strikes organized by the residents of these workers' centers, the opening of a place of prayer was often included in the list of claims. The immense majority of the centers for

Muslims are now equipped with such places of prayer, with the exception of those set up by the ADEF (managed by the employers of the building and metals industry). First of all, they were opened in pre-existing places (on the ground floor or in the basement, without any external sign of their use). For almost the past 10 years they have most often been included by the architect in the plans for a new building. At times these plans have sought, as in the case of SONACOTRA, to give a characteristic Islamic touch to the place of prayer and to its surroundings.

The place of prayer in the center belongs to the category of "collective residential locations." In general, its management is entirely left to the residents. Some of the managers of the centers do not even have a key to the place of prayer. A resident of the center, who is usually chosen by the community on the basis of his knowledge of religious affairs, acts as the imam responsible for the place. He seems to be chosen by unanimity in the majority of cases. The only problems arise in certain centers where workers of several ethnic groups live, reflecting rivalry between the black and the Maghrebian communities. To avoid this kind of frictions, which affect not only religious practices, certain organizations have tried as far as possible to set up centers housing a single ethnic group: Maghrebians in one location and blacks in another. Often, Turkish workers live in the cities themselves, in view of the extent to which they live together in family groups. For example, centers housing several ethnic groups at SONACOTRA only account for 10 to 15 percent of the total. On the other hand, AFTAM centers housing a single ethnic group, so-called "dormitory centers," in fact only account for 10 percent of the total.

The furnishing and maintenance of the prayer centers are financed by contributions made by the residents. In the case of SONACOTRA centers, a subsidy is provided, taken from the general budget for the operation of the place. Religious services are open to the residents of the center. Often, they are quite free to invite people from outside the center to attend, to the extent that security considerations permit. It seems that this kind of openhanded attitude is relatively limited, as Maghrebian families are reluctant to send their children to centers for bachelors. It is understood that there is no question of a woman going there alone. A greater degree of openness is reportedly practiced by the blacks, who are less concerned about the segregation of the sexes. In certain cases (the SONACOTRA centers in the Lyon area, for example) the managers of the centers have reached a tacit agreement with an Islamic association (or a network of associations) which wishes to be recognized as the manager of the place of prayer. In other cases, on the contrary (at ADEF centers, for example), there have been refusals to recognize this or that association, as the management has sought to have its exclusive discretionary powers respected through the use of every means available. Koranic teaching is almost wholly absent from these centers because the majority of the people concerned are bachelors. However, such teaching is sometimes available for the residents of the center and their friends, given by preachers passing through the area, for example.

#### 4.2 - Places of Prayer "in Town"

The process of establishment of a place of prayer outside worker centers closely resembles the organization of religious or cultural associations, as

these are rather often intended to manager the places of prayer. It is interesting to recall the distinction made by Dassetto and Bastenier (1985) regarding Belgium, where they note two kinds of social organizations involved in the organization of these mosques. They state: "The most frequently found kind brings together heads of families, on the basis of nationality and by neighborhood, village, or suburb and, often enough, in terms of ethnic and family ties. This involves places of prayer which perform a function limited to the area where they have been set up."

This practice noted in Belgium can also be observed in France, particularly in cities of medium size. When the local immigrant community, which is often homogenous in terms of national origins, decides to provide itself with a place of prayer (which often does double duty as a school for religious and language instruction), it organizes a subscription of funds, most of the time. At times the sums of money raised may be considerable, taking into consideration the modest income of the people involved. At times the Muslims themselves take part in the construction activity. At Mantes-la-Jolie, for example, the construction of the mosque took 1 year. A total of three Portuguese workers were paid, and they supervised the other workers, who were almost all volunteers (Mohamed Bekouchi). At times the association asks for help from the government of the residents' country of origin. The local government authorities are also asked for a contribution. Town authorities may be asked to provide land at a token rent, to guarantee loans, or even to provide a public building. The Christian religious authorities are also contacted, and many Muslim places of prayer have begun to function in the basement of churches or in parish halls. The World Muslim League may also be asked to contribute in certain cases. Its assistance most often is in the form of providing legal counsel or advice in teaching practices. At times, but more rarely, it provides financial help. According to the World Muslim League itself, about 50 of the places of prayer reportedly benefit from regular financial assistance, out of the 400 listed by its Paris office, and the total amount of money involved reportedly was 6 million francs during the period 1980-85. Andesian commented that, "in a situation where immigrants are concerned, the organization of religious activities is more the work of the faithful themselves" than that of religious or state institutions, which often only provide help later. The majority of the places of prayer opened outside the workers' centers are in this category.

Then Dassetto notes other "places of prayer (which) are established by religious movements. They are locally established, but their range of influence is wider and more extensive, involving the members and sympathizers of the movement." The mosques associated with the Tabligh illustrate perfectly this second category, which has reportedly become common in the last few years. This type of movement seeks to establish or "regain" places of prayer. However, it seems to be in the minority. Dassetto adds, with regard to Belgium: "These places of prayer, and particularly those affecting the local community, are rather quickly infiltrated by agents representing religious interests of another kind." He mentions in this connection the Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey, the Consulate of Morocco, and the Islamic Center of Brussels (associated with the World Islamic League). These remarks, in general, can also be applied to the French case and add to what we have said about the associations.

The majority of the Muslim countries try to expand their control or their influence, in most cases under cover of religious associations which are not necessarily direct projections of the various governments. For example, it is Saudi Arabia which provides some assistance through the Islamic League and the Council of Mosques. It appears that it also provides some more direct subsidies through the various Wahhabi associations operating among the black community. Although the Association of Algerians in Europe has always served as a transmission belt for the FLN, it only manages a limited number of places of worship. It is the Paris mosque which operates the "Algerian religious network." Turkey has been no less active, and we were able to observe the extreme diversity of the Turkish associations in France. It seems that the Turkish consulates do not hesitate to conduct inquiries and intervene in certain places of worship, in order to "clean things up," either directly or under cover of affiliated associations.

Finally, Dassetto has remarked that in Belgium, "The mosques, with only very rare exceptions, appear to be distinctly national institutions. This is denied elsewhere by the faithful themselves in the name of the universality of Islam." This kind of grouping on an ethnic and national basis is also found in France, at least regarding mosques of the first type described above. Religious movements of a universalist kind have a tendency to stand above these divisions, without really succeeding in doing so. However, it is appropriate to comment that this kind of division, which is so strongly marked in the case of the associations, is less so when it is a matter of attending a place of worship. In this connection Bruno Etienne states that in "Marseille in any case the mosque, as a place of community prayer, is transnational." Nevertheless, we may remark a clear separation of the Turks, who pray by themselves, most of the time, and even refuse to attend places of worship which are not reserved for them (see the case of Mantes in Bekouchi, pp 47-60). The other nationalities reportedly have a tendency to accept praying together, although coexistence between Maghrebians and blacks can arouse some problems, at times. Attendance at mosques, as far as possible, has a tendency to be divided into three categories: the Maghrebians and the blacks, on the one hand, can attend services together. The Turks stand apart.

### III. The Muslim Cultures

As we near the end of this study, we appreciate the extreme diversity of the Muslim community in France, which is divided in terms of its ethnic and national origins. The literature published both by the (Libyan) Committee of Islamic Identity as well as the World Islamic League or the Paris mosque is the same: works of piety and of Islamic learning spread about in the whole Muslim world. The situation of the Muslim immigrants in France as such does not appear to provide a powerful and unifying framework giving birth to a specific culture. Following Kepel's thesis (in ESPRIT of June 1985, p 9), we might speak of "Muslim sub-cultures which share the field of Islamic Culture." This culture itself does not take into account the whole of the cultural life lived by the people concerned."

#### 1. 'Tranquil' Islam

The first category is made up, in particular, of the older people, the first generation immigrants. Many of them practice a kind of popular and customary

Islam, a "tranquil" variety of their faith (see SANS FRONTIERE, March 1984), in which they try to subject themselves to God and to his commandments. This group has a certain amount of social cohesion and a nostalgic memory of a country which seems to be farther and farther removed from them. At first these people were not particularly religious. The decline in social pressures helped them in this respect. Among the harkis, this phenomenon is reflected to the extreme by a clear wish to integrate themselves in the French community, for example, by choosing French first names. As emigration from their countries of origin has become a continuing phenomenon, the arrival of families and the problem of the education of the children, the various social and economic crises, and the general atmosphere of relying on religion, have led immigrants of the first generation to try to rediscover their original culture and religion, with all of the difficulties related to this process.

Bastenier (in "Culture-Mosaique") has strongly condemned the ambiguities of the "cult" of some western intellectuals who search for an alleged "original culture" made up of "cultural differences," clearly recognized or fantasized on the basis of external signs, "clothing, language, culinary and religious practices, or systems of family or social relationships which specifically mark an immigrant as a foreigner and confine him to this status." Bastenier speaks of "cultural crumbs," "scattered debris taken out of context, surviving elements among the immigrants of an old system of cultural references whose foolishness daily life makes them experience clearly."

In effect, the "return" to religious and customary practices has taken place in such a context of distress. The example of the first generation of "French Muslims" is particularly significant in this regard by its clinging to traditional values and ancestral customs (for example, the cloistering of women and prohibitions on certain foods) observed after a period of voluntary assimilation. According to Wormser, these Harkis have said of themselves that "they are wearing themselves out in vain by trying to adapt themselves to a style of life which brings them nothing. They gather together, they meet, they make a contribution for the preparation and burial of their dead, they collect rather poor souvenirs of the religious practices of their childhood, with faith and superstition mixed together. They read the Koran and speak in their mother tongue, the dialect of their region, a nostalgia for which hurts them more and more."

The return to religious observance has also taken place in the context of an expressed desire to keep contact with their heritage and their country of origin, despite the distance that has developed over the years. In this sense ancestral customs and religious practices are parts of a single whole. Although the older people are convinced of the need to continue this attitude of submission to an order of things which they consider divine, they are just as much aware of their inability to transmit this attitude of submission to their children and to explain its history and reasons to them. In a general way the Muslim people in France are ignorant of the foundations of their religion. Many of them are illiterate and have never had any formal religious education. Faced with the abandonment of religious practices and the faith on the part of the younger generation, the older people feel helpless and appeal to the educated elite in their community. The Koranic schools, despite the recent expansion in their numbers, do not seem to be enough to provide for this transmission of the faith, either because they are fundamentally

not adapted to the present situation affecting Muslim immigrants in a western country, or because there are not enough of them. The various Muslim associations, and particularly the organization, "Vivre l'Islam en Occident," The World Islamic League, and the Paris mosque, have been alerted to this question and are aware of the urgent need to produce a message of faith adapted to this new reality. As Roty has said, Islam must leave the shanty town in which many Muslim immigrants live and regain its status as a source of worthwhile and balanced discourse.

Onto these customary and popular practices, situated between black magic and a reliance on charismatic preachers, has been grafted a more active practice of orthodox Islam. That is where leaders of the Muslim elite who are concerned with training the young are trying to seize their chance. An increased attendance at the mosques should make it possible to provide improved teaching of the faith and of the foundations of religious practices. In effect, for many of the immigrants of the first generation, the rediscovery of God and of his laws involves more frequent attendance at the mosques.

Psychosociology has interested itself in this phenomenon and has advanced a certain number of hypotheses to explain it. In the view of many people, "the mosque is a meeting place which makes possible the establishment of a social network and the rebuilding of a society which emigration had fragmented" (Dassetto). Moreover, this concept can be applied with as much reason to the significant increase in the number of cafes for men and immigrant businesses (religious slaughter houses, grocery stores, clothing stores, bookstores, etc), which are centers for living within an Islamic connotation. A psychosocial hypothesis has also advanced the concept of the mosque as a positive pole of purity, of certainty, and of stability, in the face of a soiled environment, the negator of cultural identity and social regulation. This hypothesis of identity makes the mosque into a kind of incarnation of a cultural identity which is most often pushed aside, denied, or scorned. National and religious identities then become mixed, and the mosques serve simultaneously as places of prayer, properly speaking, and school where national languages are taught as much as religion. A third hypothesis insists on the mosque as a place for the expression of the views of adult men, whose identity and authority are in crisis in view of the emancipation of the young people, the expansion in the role of women, questions regarding the reason for their continuing to live in a country where they are immigrants, and unemployment, which affects a growing number of them. Finally, the increase in the number of the mosques can be interpreted as the sign of settlement for people who have abandoned their intention of returning to their country of origin and who are consequently taking the necessary measures to settle down, which they often do not dare to express openly (Dassetto and Charnay).

## 2. The Second Generation

Contrary to a widespread view, the second generation of Muslim immigrants does not belong, in large numbers, to the category of militant Muslims. Quite the contrary, the second generation constitutes one of the targets of militant Islam. The young Muslims have not abandoned living a balanced life in France, integrated into this society which has become their own, for better or worse. Without any doubt, they suffer from a certain gap between a culture with Islamic connotations, that of their parents, and a French culture which is

more or less laicized and Christian. However, they do not necessarily think of this situation in terms of exclusion. The immense expansion in initiatives coming from the young Muslims demonstrates a will to develop a new culture adapted to the situation, respectful both of integration with French culture and a certain, particular cultural identity. Many analysts have had too great a tendency to treat the second generation as a separate entity, forgetting that it belongs, quite simply, to the younger generation in the suburbs of any city, more or less left out of things.

### 3. The Islamic Militant

The third category is made up of those Islamic militants of whom the media speak so often, feeding the fear of an "Muslim fundamentalist wave." However, these Muslims only belong to an Islamic "sub culture" who live alongside many others who are more widely found but less articulate. The Islamic militant begins with a negative view of the emigration of Muslims out of their own countries. In such a situation the Muslim believer, in this view, risks losing his religious identity by becoming assimilated to a non-Muslim society. In this view, emigration is only the tragic consequence of the historic defeat of the Muslims by the West, and the responsibility for this lies at the door of their leaders who no longer practice the Islamic faith. Western society, in the view of the Islamic militant, is the quintessence of atheistic materialism, determined to exploit to the utmost the Muslim people who incarnate spirituality. Hence, the destruction of the religion of Muslim immigrants is the surest guarantee of their inertia in the face of this murderous aggression. In such a situation the true believer becomes a militant, aware of having been invested with the mission of safeguarding community identity founded on religion.

Therefore, the Islamic militant fights against two enemies: unbelieving western society, on the one hand, which allegedly does not know how to provide immigrants with decent living conditions. On the other hand, he fights against the "Leftist" immigrant who is the supporter of a flexible integration into western society. The Islamic militant only thinks of emigration in terms of two alternatives: either remain in the West, but only on condition of being protected by a pure and committed kind of Islam which would make it possible for the Muslim immigrant to draw some advantage from the West, while excluding any cultural or social participation in it. Or, the return of the weakest elements to their own country, as they are incapable of resisting the siren song of this allegedly western form of materialism. Therefore, the Islamic militant follows a policy of extravagant promises and radicalization, caught in the insoluble contradiction of claiming the status of "a resident having the rights of a citizen without being one. The Islamic militant lives in the society of the immigrants but is opposed to it. He dreams of a situation where his co-religionists would live in the West but remain independent of it" (Dhaouadi, p 118).

This militant elitism draws its ideology from the abundant Islamic extremist literature coming from the Near East, North Africa, and the Indian sub continent, at times relayed by various organizations with their headquarters in London and in the Federal Republic of Germany (for the element of the Muslim Brotherhood which tends to support Syria). The Iranian revolution,

without providing these Islamic militants with any real ideological tools. due to its Shi'ite orientation, gives him pride and courage.

The works of the founding fathers of the "Association des Freres Musulmans" [The Muslim Brotherhood] have pride of place in all of the Islamic bookstores in France. The association, which was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, advocates a progressive return to Islam on the part of Muslim society through reforms and the defense of the Islamic and Arab nation against the aggression coming from the West. Above all, its concerns are moralistic and pietistic. However, all of the works of the founding fathers are re-read by the Islamic militants in the light of the radical ideas of Sayyid Qotb, an Egyptian theologian hanged by Nasser in 1966, and his imitators. The governments of the unbelievers, considered responsible for the abandonment of the Islamic faith by many Muslims, are earmarked for punishment by the true believers. However, according to Kepel (ESPRIT, June 1985), the French Government is not a target in this context. The political targets remain in the countries of Muslim emigration. The responsible authorities, considered perverse in the eyes of the Islamic militants, are considered guilty of causing the economic and social crises endured by the people, who have therefore been forced into emigration at the risk of their spiritual perdition.

All of the statements of the great figures of the Islamic militant appeal are distributed, either by cassette recordings or by pamphlets and books, through the whole network of bookstores, "grocery stores" (in the broadest sense of the word), and places of prayer. In terms of the cassette recordings, all records have been broken by chanted versions of the Koran and by the sermons of Sheik Kichk, an Egyptian (analyzed by Kepel in LE PROPHETE ET PHARAON) [The Prophet and Pharaoh], who was a victim of persecution by Anwar Sadat. Sheik Kichk is a master of the thought of Islamic militants throughout the world. The sermons by Sheik Kichk (several hundred of them, published in collected form in Cairo) are also distributed in the form of small pamphlets. Among the best sellers of this kind of literature, published both in Arabic, as well as in English and French, are the works of Sayvid Qotb, who was the first among the Muslim Brotherhood to analyze the Islamic society of the 1960's in terms of "Jahiliya," that form of "barbarism" which preceded the preaching of the Koran, and those of Abou-l-Ala al-Maudoudi, the Pakistani theoretician of the Islamic state and of religious militantism (he died in 1979). The Islamic militants also have their "national" ideologists, such as Rachid Ghanouchi, leader of the "Mouvement de la tendance islamique tunisien" [Tunisian Movement of the Islamic Tendency], and Abd Assalam Yassine, organizer of religious opposition to the sultan of Morocco.

Several publications figure in the range of magazines popular with the Islamic militants. AL-GHURABA [The Strangers], a monthly magazine published in London by the "L'Association des etudiants musulmans dans le Royaume-Uni et Irlande" [Association of Muslim Students in the United Kingdom and Ireland], in cooperation with "L'Union des associations islamiques en Europe" [The Union of Islamic Associations in Europe]. It is a specialized publication aimed at the immigrant communities and is widely distributed in France. Typical of this kind of publication, the articles in it are above all "political," listing all of the crises and acts of aggression suffered by the Muslim communities throughout the world. The "West" is, of course, denounced in it, but so are all of the governments of "unbelievers" in Muslim countries. In competition

with militancy of Iranian origin, AL-MOUSLIMOUN (The Muslims), a weekly published in Saudi Arabia, makes space available to various leaders of the "Muslim Brotherhood" type and other, more radical factions. Other publications still to be found in bookstores catering to Islamic militants are AL-DAWA (The Call), published by "Le Centre culturel islamique d'Autriche" [The Islamic Cultural Center in Austria], which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood; AL-MUJTAMA (Society), published in Kuwait by "L'Association de la reforme sociale" [The Association for Social Reform; AL-MUSLIM (The Muslim), published by the "Islamic Party" of Libya; or AL-ALAM AL-ISLAMI (The Islamic World), a supplement to AL-ALAM, published in London, which advocates ideas close to those of the Iranian revolution.

This militant form of Islam appears to affect only a relatively limited category of the Muslim community in France. Its activism and its "visibility" in mosques and public places (bookstores in particular) have succeeded in making people believe, incorrectly, that it has remarkable influence. Not all of those who listen to Sheik Kichk and those who read Maudoudi are terrorists, ready to destabilize France and the West. Certainly, the audience reached by preachers of this kind extends beyond the limited circle of Islamic militants. The message, the tradition, and the kind of Islamic pride regained and publicly proclaimed have attracted more than one isolated and lonely immigrant. However, in many cases the message will not go beyond providing moral and spiritual consolation. On the other hand, among the Islamic militants themselves, this kind of message does not lead to appeals for an Islamic revolution in France. The target remains the leaders of the countries of origin of the immigrants. However, the danger of such an ideology lies in the systematic exaggeration of the allegedly specific character of the "Muslim," both in his own country and as an immigrant living abroad. Any reasoned and balanced integration of the Muslim community in France is rejected at once, thereby deliberately leading to limiting Muslims to living in ghettos and thereby leading to violence.

However, such a message hides one of its fundamental aspects: although the Islamic militants denounce (and with what violence!) the iniquity of the governments in their countries of origin which virtually forced them to move to the countries to which they emigrated, they do not, for all of that, speak of returning to their own countries, at least as far as they are personally concerned, these new elites who are capable of defending themselves against the threats coming from "materialist" society. They openly call themselves Muslims in France and are convinced that they will remain so. Each and every one of them takes advantage of the material advantages of this same "materialist" society, to varying degrees, of course. Their message, which they claim is free of any western influence, is only, in fact, the product of their time, roughly indicating the response to their crisis of identity.

At times this elitist form of militant Islam reflects in its uncompromising religious message--although in fraudulent form--an extreme claim to identity recently expressed by certain young people in the second generation of "French Muslims," among others. According to Wormser, for this new generation born in France, "a return to their countries of origin is a much more complex reality" than that of their parents, which resembles our first category of "tranquil Muslims." "They know, in their heart of hearts, that they will live in France all of their life. They think and reflect in western fashion. They feel

their Arab identity as a kind of heritage. The majority of them do not understand or speak Arabic very well, particularly the teenagers. Many of them try to learn Arabic, but, for the moment, the Islamic religion fascinates them, without their being able to practice it. They establish groups to talk about it and inform themselves about it, but they do not read the Koran, nor do they participate in Islamic prayers. They have little taste for family traditions. Algeria has become a myth for them, a "land flowing with milk and honey," which they confuse with Islam as a whole. With pride and assurance they claim all of Arab civilization. This is a cultural fact. Their Islam is a kind of lay religion. They need happiness and equality. Thanks to the triumphant force of Islam today, thanks to the impact and the appearance of the Islam of the past, they hope to come and sit at the banquet table of modern France, as rich and honored people." In such a context the appeal to Islam in effect relates much more to a phantasmic kind of identity than to a religion, properly speaking, and still less does it relate to terrorism. We see here a dream of an identity never achieved, without the means of living it and expressing it.

Islam in France or French Islam? The question comes up when we consider the identities alleged to be possessed by the people coming from the Islamic part of the world. We have been able to observe the quite considerable potential of ethnic and national identity in the various groups and associations of the Islamic community. Little distinction is made between ancestral customs and religious rules, despite the constant appeals for the unity of the Islamic people. However, the question is posed in radically different form for the parents than for the children. Although the first generation has resumed the practice of its customs once again, responding to radical calls for cutting itself off from the modern world, the second generation, in general, seems to be orienting itself toward a feeling of belonging to French society. This feeling is critical and varies from place to place, of course, but Islamic religious identity has shaped itself in some way to conform to the contours of a common citizenship with French youth confronted with the questions of unemployment and being ignored by economic and social life. With the growth of its second generation, Islam in France is becoming French Islam, a form of Islam still in the process of becoming, shaken by the crises of rejection or charismatic appeals, but a form of Islam changed by its belonging to a new generation of the French people.

Up to now the appeal of militant Islam seem to have failed to mobilize the masses of the suburbs of the large cities. Although attitudes of violence are displayed toward French society, these probably reflect the feelings of rejection felt by a whole generation of young French people toward a system which is seen as crushing and discarding them. Finally, speaking of Islam in France or even of French Islam still reflects a kind of improper simplification, in view of the diversity of messages and practices related consciously or unconsciously to Muslim culture.

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ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

**EYSKENS VIEWS POSSIBILITY OF TAX REFORM**

Brussels LE SOIR in French 22 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Guy Depas: "Mark Eyskens and Tax Reform: Buds Only Open In The Spring"]

[Text] Cut down, simplify and, in one word, reduce taxation: The project is already in the works! But Minister of Finance Mark Eyskens advises "caution," concurring on that point with the conventional Martens: "Buds will open in the spring only if enough sap has risen."

Prices fall? Taxes rise! Short of revenues, the last two governments were forced to divert taxes from their traditional intent by appropriating for the benefit of the state the gain due to the wage reduction. In short, Belgium, as OECD just pointed out in a recent report on compared tax systems--see our Thursday issue--is hereafter listed as one of the three countries to make the western "hit parade" for the lemon prize: 46.73 percent of the gross national product was absorbed by the public treasury, a level that may have been exceeded since then if we are to believe the remarks made by the minister of finance himself. Aggravating circumstance: Nowhere else, or almost nowhere else, does the range of withdrawals seems, through the escalation of scales and, above all, that of special levies, as poorly correlated as in Belgium.

Made legal as a means of economic efficiency and clarification of fraudulent techniques, the deduction from capital income levied at the source, criticizes the left, is scandalously insufficient when compared to the tax rates on work-related income. And the right does not fail to point out that the geometrical progression of marginal rates, further strengthened by the recent increase of special dues, led large segments of the population to lose their motivation: A gross wage of 1.5 million thus cost 1,885,000 francs to the employer and leaves a net buying power of only 883,511 francs to the employee, or barely 45 percent of the onset wage!

Excessive? Undoubtedly. A short time ago, the National Bank itself pointed out that this development was leading us straight to an economic Malthusianism reaction. All of this is going to be changed. How? When? There lies the problem, told us Mark Eyskens.

## "Confusion Is Lying In Wait For Us"

He declares: "The more aware we are of the abuses of the tax system, the more we demand its reform. And the more we demand it, the more we politicize the problem: Now, not a day goes by that someone, from the majority as well as the opposition, does not speak up to submit his suggestion." The minister believes that these interferences are regrettable and dangerous. "Confusion is lying in wait for us."

Mark Eyskens recalls that the tax system cannot be managed as an independent policy. Is the current income tax rate scandalous? Of course. "This scandal, however, is due to another one: That of state expenses. The prime minister is absolutely right when he contends that no tax decrease will be possible as long as a reorganization plan has not been implemented."

### Budget First

Guy Verhofstadt, Mark Eyskens' colleague in charge of budget, implies to anyone who wants to listen to him that now is the right time to prepare a reform that could be implemented in a very short time. Mark Eyskens replies: "Agreed and disagreed. Everyone knows from experience that there can be a tremendous margin between a draft and an implemented budget. As it stands, a request to implement the 1987 draft budget has yet to be made." For him, nothing concrete can be undertaken before that budget is checked, which will be done in February, to prove its reliability. "You see," says the minister, "If Verhofstadt succeeds in reducing expenses, I will succeed in reducing taxes. If he fails, however..."

### Much More Than a 3 Percent Drop?

In the final analysis, what is the procedure advocated by Mark Eyskens? It is broken down into two stages: First, budgetary control and, then, the tabling of a reform project, on which, moreover, work was immediately begun and which could be approved in 1987, to be implemented in 1988 at the earliest.

What project? The minister of finance says that it must tackle three issues at the same time: Simplification of the system; unmerciful curtailing of tax expenses; and decrease of the real pressure of direct taxes which should be accompanied by a rebalancing between the latter and indirect taxes (on consumption).

A tax relief which could amount to 2 or 3 percent? Mark Eyskens replies: "Be serious. It would be much too little to be both politically profitable and economically efficient." So much the better!

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ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

VERHOFSTADT ANNOUNCES 1987 BUDGET

Brussels LE SOIR in French 25 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Guy Depas: "The 1987 Budget Is Ready: Verhofstadt Remains Cautious"]

[Text] The 1987 budget is ready. Amounting initially to 194.8 billion, the savings expected from the Val Duchesse plan were reduced to 191.2 billion, following the verification of all available data. The difference is due essentially to the easing of the tax system of preretirees to whom, after the lengthy July political arbitrations, the budgetary "conclave" decided to reserve a less austere fate than it had considered at the onset.

According to Minister Verhofstadt's computations, this 3.6 billion shortage in earnings, however, does not mortgage the appointed reorganization objective. The probable deficit between state revenues and expenses, which we must bring ourselves to finance through a loan, remains estimated at 417.8 billion, or the equivalent of 8.1 percent of the gross national product, as compared to an assumed 567.5 billion, or 11.5 percent of the 1986 GNP.

To be sure, since the conclusion of the work of that conclave, the vice-prime minister and PVV minister of budget has not been idle as it has sometimes been contended. Presiding most of the summer over what used to be called the "ax committee," which has been coyly rebaptized the "joint discussions committee," he succeeded in trimming a further 24.5 billion off the expenses that his colleagues were hoping to be able to secure.

The proof is, he reported to a limited Council of Ministers, that, having downgraded the first estimates of economic growth to take into account the orientation of the economic situation proclaimed everywhere (therefore a probable reduction of revenues amounting to 9.4 billion as compared to the early outline) all sectors continue to hold their own.

[Relative] Caution...

Guy Verhofstadt, says that caution is the banner under which the 1987 budget is being formulated. The "obvious" overestimate, 68 billion according to Guy Spitaels, "relatively marginal but nonetheless real," 15.5 billion according to the National Bank, of the 1986 deficit used as a basis for the 1987 computation is not being taken into consideration. On the contrary, since, by changing the

prospects of the nominal economic growth from 3.9 percent to 3.7 percent in 1986 and to over 4 percent, according to some analysts such as OECD, Kreditbank, etc, the initially set 624 billion net balance to be financed, should policy remain unchanged, that is to say, without the effects of Val Duchesse, was finally increased to 633.5 billion.

...Relative [Caution]?

The minister of budget who, however, in view of the latest developments, may be rashly speculating in that area, says that caution is needed in estimating the probable exchange rate of the dollar and interest rates, these rates which we know directly influence the public debt charge. Choosing an average rate of 42 francs for one dollar in 1987, it is actually lower than the current rate (42.11 on Tuesday). As for the interest rate reached, it is 7.6 percent, slightly lower than the one currently in effect in the marketplace.

Be that as it may, figures for the 1987 budget profil are as follows: 1,868.4 billion for expenses and 1,452.6 billion for revenues leaving (including 2 billion for treasury expenses) a deficit of 417.8 billion to be financed through a loan.

A "paper" or "truth" budget? Only time will tell. Still, politically, the adventure is already odd and...significant: Probably for the first time in the budgetary history of the past 20 or 30 years, the opposition is not contesting the work of the government by accusing it of committing the sin of optimism. It is on the contrary the pessimism of the estimates that it criticizes in the name of social interest.

There is no doubt about it, Martens is the smasher that he claims to be. A smasher of taboos, that is.

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MANNESMANN TO CUT WORK FORCE BY 20 PERCENT IN THREE CITIES

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 12 Sep 86 p 10

[Article by Leonhard Spielhofer: "The Pipe Business Runs Out of Steam--Mannesmann Bets on Personnel Cuts"]

[Text] The Mannesmann people and their pipe plants ran into heavy weather this year. Beset for several years by worldwide overcapacity and collapsing prices, the firm suffered a twofold hail of misfortune in the first half-year. First, the dollar exchange rate fell sharply. Mannesmann is especially hard hit, although a good share of pipeline production is sold on a dollar basis.

But that wasn't all. With falling oil prices, oil company management's desire to invest also fell rapidly. Mannesmann, the largest German pipe producer by far with an annual capacity of around 3 million tons, felt the effects directly in its order books. From January to June 1986, orders for seamless pipes declined by 40 percent -- and these represent just two-thirds of total output. Even the Soviet Union and China held back on large orders and, in contrast to previous years, were counted out as anchors to windward. As a final blow, international prices for steel pipe gave further ground.

Now the managers reached for the alarm bell. "The pipe plants," they wrote in their report to the executive bodies of the parent company, "reached an existence-threatening crisis." To overcome it, they see only one remedy: 6,500 of 30,000 currently employed plant workers will have to leave in coming months as early retirees or (the younger ones) by dismissal with notice, financially cushioned with separation payments. The plant management also fears 1,000 genuine firings.

Particularly affected are the plants in Duisburg, Muelheim/Ruhr and Duesseldorf. Now that locations in Hellenthal, Mindelheim and Solingen-Ohligs have been given up, the plant in Duesseldorf-Lierenfeld is to be sacrificed. Changes are also in store for the so-called medium pipe trains in Rath near Duesseldorf and Bous in the Saar.

But it was not so great a surprise when the storm broke over the subsidiary, which represents barely a third of the conglomerate's turnover of DM18 billion and, with 30,000 workers, two-fifths of its domestic labor force. Ever since

1980 there have been rumblings in the pipeline business. After 30 years of unbroken and sometimes steeply rising rates of increase, it was then that the first big break occurred in the curve of worldwide steel pipe consumption. At the same time, however, excess capacity burgeoned, again unleashing vigorous price wars. The robust world of steel pipe--not so long ago rated a critical strategic commodity in American eyes and placed by Washington on the list of goods embargoed for delivery to the Soviet Union--belongs to the past.

The Mannesmann pipe business slipped into the red as early as 1983 and 1984. It would have fallen immeasurably deeper if the FRG had complied with the U.S. veto on the German-Russian gas pipeline deal at the beginning of the 1980's, which was worth billions. Last year the company merely broke even. In 1986 and 1987, management actually expects record losses which will probably amount to well over half a billion Deutsche marks and set off crises which will bring into question the firm's viability. In any case, a revenue loss (possibly occurring quite soon) averaging DM100 per ton means over DM200 million less in earnings. The fall in the dollar exchange rate, lower capacity utilization and price declines are assuredly having a far greater effect than the DM100 difference would imply.

Increased sales are hardly to be expected. On the contrary. Japan, complains the in-house report, is equipped with the most modern and productive steel plants in the Western World, and overwhelms its competitors in the traditional markets of Western Europe, as in the United States, with the sharp-edged weapon of price. But newcomers such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or South Korea are also successfully trying out their own blades. With plants that are sometimes quite modern, low wages and favorable raw material costs, they are able more and more to make up for low productivity. In price, but also in quality, they have been able for some time to meet German and European competition and to destroy step by step its image, cultivated for decades, of technological leadership. That was how Mannesmann once achieved great size.

Wistfully, the company recalls better times: "Steel pipes are largely perfected and standardized mass production items. Possibilities of distinguishing oneself from a competitor in a positive sense through the product are limited to isolated cases of especially high customer demands." Parallels abound in the rest of Western Europe's steel industry, whose crises had been accompanied by similar arguments.

At the same time the domestic market is much too small for Mannesmann, at its present capacity, to hold its head even slightly above water. Fully 2.2 million tons of steel pipe consumption annually are available within the FRG, and of that quantity 1 million tons are firmly in the hands of importers. Two-thirds of the Mannesmann pipe works' facilities would go unutilized without exports.

Escape routes such as the production of other steel products do not exist, for the traditional enterprise is the only large supplier whose mills may produce nothing but steel for its own use. That is a consequence of the

agreement concluded in 1970 with Thyssen, under which Thyssen in Duisburg withdrew from pipe manufacture in favor of Mannesmann. In return, Mannesmann gave up rolled steel manufacture. Since then, Thyssen has held a one-fourth share in Mannesmann's pipe works. What proved to be an advantage for Mannesmann during the 10 years of a Europe-wide steel crisis--independence of crisis cartels and EC control--is now becoming more and more a straitjacket. For the Mannesmann group as a whole, of course, pipes long ago ceased playing first fiddle. The weaker units were reorganized early on. Little by little, the Rexroth, Demag (both in machinery manufacture), Hartmann & Braun and Kienzle (electrical engineering) shareholdings were acquired. The transformation from a steel producing to a "technology" firm is still the top goal of the conglomerate's strategy.

In order to bring costs and revenues back into balance, management views wage costs alone as "the sole type of expenditure capable of being significantly influenced by the firm." Since 1980 the work force has shrunk by about a third. Once a further 6,500 workers have left, every second job in the pipe works will have been abolished within a few years.

With the additional personnel reductions, costs will have been reduced by nearly DM400 million a year. Another DM120 million is to be saved by additional rationalization measures. Steps toward modernization, to be sure, were constantly under way in earlier years. Since 1977, steel consumption per ton of pipe fell from 1,300 to 1,200 kilograms, and energy consumption from 880 kilograms of hard coal to 760 kilograms. And the index of cost per man-hour was reduced during this period from 100 to 60 today--a greater fall, thanks to higher productivity, than was to be expected from the job elimination figures.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

COMMISSION STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS REPORTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 19/20 Oct 86 p 13

[Text] The Commission on Social Security Accounts met on 17 October to consider the changes in the accounts under the general system since July 1986, which were summarized in the first bulletin on the situation published by the commission. The forecast by the commission is a little more pessimistic than the published forecasts for July.

In effect a net decline in the rate of receipts (contributions received) was observed, compared to 1985 and the first few months of 1986. This development is a result of deflation. If this change continues, receipts for all of 1986 could be 0.3 percent below the forecasts made for the year. However, one cannot be certain that we will not see the improvement recorded at the end of 1985, particularly if the number of salaried employees remains stable.

In parallel fashion expenditures was slightly higher than the forecasts made in all areas. This was particularly the case with health insurance, where there was an "increase" in pharmacy and laboratory analysis expenditures, and also and more recently in the case of hospitalization costs. Fortunately, the division of hospitalization expenditures between the different systems of health insurance may be more favorable than anticipated in the case of the general system, which would reduce these costs by about 1 point (about 1.7 billion francs).

This is also the case with retired persons, for whom increased expenditures in the order of 800 million francs (up by about 0.6 percent) are anticipated, as a result of a larger number of persons reaching retirement age who had received relatively higher salaries and who contributed to social security for a longer period of time. Finally, the same observation has been made regarding family allowances for reasons which are still not clear. Does this reflect a more rapid increase in allocations for young children, an extension of the period of schooling, and therefore a later date for children's leaving the family home?

Furthermore, the continued decline of end of the month social security balances since the "peak" reached at the end of February 1986 (48 billion francs), down to 19.8 billion francs at the end of September 1986, could accelerate by the end of 1986, if the trend of expenditures and receipts should be confirmed in the last few months of the year.

4 December 1986

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

**COST, METHODS FOR PRIVATIZATION REVIEWED**

Paris LE FIGARO ECONOMIE in French 20 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Henri d'Armagnac]

[Text] "One method: the importance of the stakes affecting the credibility of government action." No doubt, this is the most critical chapter, with all of its nuances and allowances for relativity, as well as the most original aspect of the preliminary report presented by Alain Griotteray, special reporter for the Commission on Finance of the National Assembly. The essence of the report is the real cost of the nationalization of property, its context and method, and the preparation and evaluation of the privatization program.

The behavior of the state, presently a stockholder in the denationalization program, is important. This is an element of the equation with several aspects. The first statement by Alain Griotteray on the matter is: "When it offers to the public securities which belong to it, the state cannot behave like an ordinary vendor." The writer says that there is a double obligation for the state: first, trying to obtain a price related to the economic value of the assets which it has at its disposal. Then, its second concern, which is not in conflict with the first: "The state cannot fail to be interested in what becomes of the securities it sells, as far as their increase in price on the market is concerned, as well as the subsequent transfers of property rights they will be subject to." This is a difficult task because, after the sale, the state cannot allow itself to take corrective action to repair any damage which has been done.

**An Initial Lack of Clarity**

The credibility of the state, as the current stockholder, also implies that the question of "immediately setting up one or several solid nuclei" must be dealt with in a frank and realistic way. As we have said in these pages, the question comes up through the diversity of the procedures involved in getting the process under way and the distribution of capital, eventually outside the market, and the development of a solid nucleus among the shareholders of certain companies subject to privatization. The question also comes up in connection with the criteria for an eventual decision in this sense.

In his view Alain Griotteray thinks that it is clear that "public service firms and even more particularly large financial establishments having a very

broad range of customers (such as the Credit Lyonnais, the Societe Generale de Banque, and the Banque National de Paris) can credibly function on the basis of a highly dispersed group of stockholders, particularly if a substantial proportion of their customers, as well as their personnel, are encouraged to purchase their securities." He recalls the British example, under which British Telecoms today has 1.6 million individual stockholders, whereas as many as 96 percent of its employees have responded to the offer to buy stock reserved for them.

Certainly, there are industrial companies which simultaneously have a large amount of shares available on the market and a very dispersed group of stockholders. We might mention here, in particular, Air Liquide in France and IBM in the United States. However, other companies would be exposed to a number of risks if they were prohibited from setting up stable and clearly individualized groups of stockholders. This is a key point in the report, an essential question today for a number of large companies subject to privatization.

The report reflects an attitude of clarity and avoids polemics, but it agrees with the views of many investors regarding the financial market: "It is difficult to believe that companies such as Paribas or Suez, which continue principally as trading banks and firms managing investment portfolios, could not agree to having a substantial portion of their capital controlled by one or several, internationally recognized company groups (either already existing or to be established in the future). The very nature of their activity implies that their leaders may refer in a powerful way to the legitimacy resulting from the direct control of capital."

It should be noted that the reporter considers that "the problem posed by insurance companies results rather from the need to bring together, in connection with the privatization program, existing companies of their respective sector, in order to form blocs of stockholders and carry out joint investments. In effect, it is appropriate to strengthen existing entities (UAP, the largest French insurance company, now ranks 25th in the world). The government seems not to wish to make public its position on this problem, whereas apparently it was aware of the facts.

Here is the position adopted by Alain Griotteray: he cannot adopt an attitude which gives priority to subsequent reclassification efforts, through purchases and associations in the market, without, however, ignoring the previous preparations made. He fears that: "For some time to come this initial lack of clarity will affect the ability of responsible groups to act. At the international level this would increase the vulnerability of the groups most open to the outside world."

Neither can we ignore or forget that many small savers interested in the eventual acquisition of securities would want to know which groups would play an operational role in this or that company before making their decision to invest. The author thinks that the method determined on for the privatization of TF1 [French TV channel] is, "if not more convenient, at least clearer." This method consists of clearly designating investors to provide a portion of the capital reserved for them.

Regarding the broad range of stockholders, a political term dear to the government, Alain Griotteray thinks that this is an opportunity which should be seized. He feels that this can be an "occasion for the rediscovery of business enterprise by individual families," following a period during which the rate of family savings declined from 18.6 percent of disposable income in 1975 to 12.3 percent of disposable income in 1985.

However, he has this warning to express against the distribution of stock to the employees of a company: "In the name of a certain kind of relationship between capital and labor, excessively onerous obligations should not be imposed on them and particularly too draconian prohibitions on reselling their stock." Freedom is essential.

Regarding the exceptional and temporary characteristics of government measures adopted to limit foreign investments, Alain Griotteray emphasizes that, above all, "a financial market should be open to foreigners."

It should be recalled that American residents of France at the most have no more than 8 to 9 million francs invested in French securities, whereas the American pension funds alone annually handle in all financial markets a portfolio of 1.6 trillion dollars. One must also say that international investors should have broader access to the Paris financial market, if only as a prelude to the complete opening of the European financial market.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

INTENSIVE TRAINING SCHEDULE OF HOME DEFENSE BRIGADE DETAILED

Bonn LOYAL in German May 86 pp 24, 25

[Article by Alix Gordian: "Simply Phenomenal--Reservists in the Home Defense Brigade"; first paragraph is LOYAL introduction]

[Text] When talk within the field army turns to the home defense brigades, that is, the territorial army, one frequently encounters faint smiles suggestive of mild disdain. By contrast, higher-ranking officials in the field army within the Ministry of Defense tell another story: "When I am with the territorial army, I am among soldiers; with the others I am not so sure." The first part of this statement should be underlined three times, because many a field army unit could take a page from the quality of training, motivation, operational readiness, and adaptability of the reservists. The mission of the territorial army is clearly defined: The brigades have the task of defending the rear combat zone--to fight against hostile airborne units or other forces that have penetrated--in order to maintain the field army's freedom of maneuver. They may also be assigned to a corps for missions within the corps' rear area or even closer to the front. Assignment to a field army division is also possible, and, therefore, they may be involved in the movement of units at the forward edge of battle. Home defense brigades must also master the art of collaboration with allied forces.

However, since they are cadre units, for the most part the brigades are highly dependent on mobilization. For that reason, the training of reservists assumes a special importance. Reserve soldiers, for the same reason, appreciate a mobilization assignment to units of the territorial army. During their reserve training they feel appreciated and truly integrated; their training is excellent and, above all, they are needed. The soldiers in active units know that they are dependent on the reservists.

The territorial army's accomplishments in this area--grossly and consistently underestimated by the field army--are clearly demonstrated, for instance, by Home Defense Brigade 54 located at Trier in the Territorial Command South. This major formation, with its units and motorized infantry training centers, is deployed at 11 locations over a wide area between Trier, Zweibruecken, Kaiserslautern, Mainz, and Lahnstein.

While active units of the home defense brigades train the reservists themselves, reservists of the equipment units are trained in one of five motorized infantry training centers, as are those assigned directly to the brigade or to military region or military subregion commands.

As entire motorized infantry battalion of a home defense regiment--as it exists, for instance, at military region commands--is then activated for this purpose. Training lasts for 12 days, the first 6 of which are devoted to theoretical training in an appropriate center. The second part of the training takes place at a maneuver site, where the battalion undergoes a self-contained combat exercise.

The training center commanders manage 18 such sessions per year. Each session involves 100 to 150 men ranging from private first class to captain. Roughly 8,000 alert reservists were thus trained in 1985. Since 1977 each of the five training centers has trained an average of 34,000 reservists in state-of-the-art military know-how and ability.

"All of them are first class," comments Lt Col Lothar Imme, commander of Center 54/1 at Mainz, where primarily staff and supply reservists receive their instruction. "Although their motivation in the beginning ranges from zero to enthusiastic, they all want to be challenged and in the end they all come away with the feeling of being needed and of having accomplished something." Complete motorized infantrymen for area and site defense are being trained by Lt Col Heddo Maeder. "We recruit these people primarily from the regions where they may actually have to defend sites."

The first half of the 12 days of training is devoted to leadership training, and the second half to practical applications, which takes place at a maneuver area. In this context, Maeder pointed out a fact that should come as good news to reservists in view of last February's cold spell: The latest suits designed to protect against cold and wetness are a success. The reservists can receive this equipment from their respective military subregion commands, if requested in time, before arriving at the training site. The commanders of the other three training centers have, on the whole, had similar experiences with the reservists. "Their cooperation is good as long as their training is geared toward operational employment. This means training them sufficiently in the tasks they must accomplish so that they can generally perform these tasks."

#### Ready To Commit Themselves

Lt Col Heinz Riedl, commander of Center 54/4 in Zweibruecken--the only one in Military District IV with a training course for noncommissioned officers-- is very enthusiastic about reserve soldiers: "Their commitment is simply phenomenal! This is true whether they are soldiers who can be employed immediately or who have barely looked at a gun. Their willingness to cooperate is extremely high."

Nor do reservists pose a problem for the active units of Home Defense Brigade 54. Supply Company 540, for instance, in February adopted the fellowship unit of reservists at Greimerath near Saarbruecken, and prepared a document to that effect. The reservists in turn showed their appreciation by presenting a homemade gun, modeled after an original from the time of Frederick the Great, which now occupies a place of honor at the company's garrison in Trier.

In the fall, the brigade will participate in the 1986 army maneuver "Franconian Shield" as the only major self-contained unit of the territorial army. Half of the 2,600 soldiers participating in the exercise will be reservists. Their active comrades are already being prepared for this mobilization exercise, and their own training is being further improved.

For this purpose, Col August Benischke, commander of the "54th," was able to consolidate his active units in the circular deployment area at the "in-house" Baumholder maneuver site, which is located in the center of this area. "We are very happy about this," commented General Staff Major Dieter Schuster, Brigade G-3, "because only rarely do we have the opportunity for everybody to train together."

At Baumholder, vigorous efforts were being made, and not only because of the cold which the soldiers actually ignored because their new winter outfits were most effective. Colonel Benischke really knows how to challenge his men. Regardless of whether they were men from an armored battalion with M-48s, field artillery men, or motorized infantrymen on an M-111, "there were no soldiers who were not outside once a day on the firing range," the commander said. The reason for this was the fact that "combat firing of combined arms" was being emphasized during this 14-day period and was carefully observed by the commander of Military District IV, Major General Holzfuss. The state of training of the soldiers, from staff to supply and maintenance companies, was striking. Everyone--enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers--could be seen in the field almost daily during combat training. Which member of a staff unit of the field army would have such intensive, if any, "ground contact?"

Also amazing was the manner in which even the most junior recruits at guard positions at the entrance to the firing range would report when the commander's car pulled up. They executed their control duties carefully and with assurance, particularly in the dark late one evening when the pennant on the ILTIS and the the occupants could not be recognized easily. Colonel Benischke was consequently not stinting with his praise, which he continued to offer almost effusively when assessing the general results of the firing exercise. It was thus easy for commanders and assistant commanders to perform their functions. The reservists will have the same experience when reporting in September. At that time the leadership and operational personnel--officers, selected noncommissioned officers and drivers, a total of 632 soldiers--will be the first to be called to various garrisons and transferred to Baumholder for a so-called test run. There they will be briefed for 3 days by active personnel and soldiers of the motorized infantry training centers. The remaining roughly 700 reservists will arrive subsequently.

According to Colonel Benische's plan, all reservists will first participate in an intensive exercise at Baumholder followed by a crossing of the Rhine, which, for all practical purposes, constitutes their entry into the large-scale "Franconian Shield" maneuver.

#### A Great Training Success for Both Sides

"Participation," said Major Schuster, "should be such that one cannot tell the difference between the field army and the home defense brigade." However, since alert reservists can be called only once a year for combat training, from now till fall Brigade 54 will conduct 18 official events for a total of 25 days in preparation for "Franconian Shield." Primarily officers and noncommissioned officers will be invited. Because of the limited availability of the men, these will be primarily weekend events. This has recently become easier, since day-long official events can now be counted as military training, which is important because of the required promotion periods.

There can be no question that reservists are being accepted by the active units of Home Defense Brigade 54. "It is a great success for the training of both components," comments Colonel Benischke. "The field army needs only about 20 percent reservists to reach a company's required complement. We need 50 percent, which is also the decisive difference for acquiring the mental attitude needed to take this task seriously. It is a lengthy training process if one is only rarely involved," said the commander. "With regard to taking the reservists seriously--and they us--we are far ahead of the field army!"

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MINISTER DISCUSSES DEFENSE POLICY, COOPERATION

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 86 pp 14-15

[Interview with French Minister of Defense Andre Giraud, date and place not specified: "I am Strongly in Favor of German-French Cooperation"]

[Text] Since the parliamentary elections of 16 March 1986 France had had a new administration headed by Gaullist Jacques Chirac, who appointed Andre Giraud, born in 1925 in Bordeaux, as minister of defense in his cabinet. Inasmuch as the new minister of defense was confronted immediately upon taking office with the problems besetting German-French arms cooperation--which is practically at the point of paralysis--he took this opportunity of expressing his position on several questions addressed to him by WEHRTECHNIK.

[Question] France now has a new administration. Does this mean that it now has a new defense policy? If so, could you provide some details on it?

[Answer] To defend one's country means to protect it against any kind of threat to which it may be exposed. Defense is necessarily a national matter, that is, it cannot be determined by party politics. The military aspect is obviously not the only one to be taken into consideration, but it is the essential one: our armed forces must be seen as a reliable and non-controversial element of our desire for independence. I intend to enhance France's capacity to defend itself by concentrating my activities upon three points: to preserve traditional military values; to adapt our armament to technological progress; and to strive for steady support by the nation to its armed forces.

[Question] Were there any decisions made or projects initiated by your predecessors in the previous administration which you consider to have been mistakes and which you would aim to correct as quickly as possible?

[Answer] There has been a delay in equipping our armed forces under the provisions of the 84/88 Program. This delay is currently being carefully examined.

[Question] Certain French and foreign sources are criticizing the "force de frappe", claiming that it absorbs too large a share of the defense budget to the detriment of the main conventional weapon systems. Do you agree with this analysis? If so, what will you do to improve the situation?

[Answer] The "force de frappe" is the cornerstone of French defense and the funds expended in its behalf cannot be considered out of context and in comparison with the so-called conventional defense.

[Question] It is now a fact that the U.S. SDI program will be implemented. The U.S. administration has been successful in obtaining agreement and participation in it on the part of the leading European members of NATO. This creates a risk for France to become isolated politically and technologically, with a threat to the credibility of the "force de frappe." What is France's position in this respect?

[Answer] It will be a long time before the SDI program will have the capability of developing an autonomous defense system in space. This program has produced an essential insight: Washington no longer talks about removing nuclear deterrence, or replacing it with an alternative solution. Defense in space and nuclear deterrence, those cornerstones of our security system, now appear to be complementary solutions rather than competing ones.

[Question] During the past year the French government has decided to withdraw from the European EFA Combat aircraft project. Later on, President Mitterand proposed a cooperative and harmonizing venture for the EFA and the national RAFALE program with respect to components. What is the official position of the new administration? Is there discussion about rejoining the EFA project, or are the reasons for France's withdrawal, as decided by the previous administration, still valid? The joint German-French PAH-2/HAC program is currently stuck in a critical phase. What intentions does the administration have to get this project going again?

[Answer] Technological progress and system costs are growing at such a rate that, for the sake of purely maintaining continuity, one would be forced gradually to convert the entire national budget to a defense budget. It is no longer possible to manufacture all the needed materiel in a single country. Cooperation thus becomes a basic prerequisite for modern defense. Either every single piece of equipment is developed by a team of 12 participants, or a decision is made for a sensible distribution of technical responsibility, thus making optimum use of each country's capabilities. The second method is more effective by far.

Personally, I lean toward a general search for a balance of responsibilities, rather than doing this for each individual project. I am a great champion of German-French cooperation, but we are finding ourselves in an absurd situation. We are independently developing a modern tank which is said to be superior to the LEOPARD 2, which is, however, very difficult. On the other hand, the Germans and the French are involved in a helicopter program which does not satisfy anyone and which is unlikely to fulfill the potential of our helicopter development experience, which has amply proven itself. In looking at the sum total of our armament requirements, it should be possible to define a global balance of areas of responsibilities and industrial utilization. This is the idea which I have proposed to the DRG defense minister.

[Question] The new administration plans to reprivatize most of the enterprises which have come under state control during the last few years. What part does the defense industry play in this?

[Answer] As far as the defense plants are concerned, if their employees work under the same conditions as civil servants do, they must also be subject to the same rules. We have no plans to make changes in the status of the defense plants. Nor do we plan to manufacture weapons there which are not needed. As far as privatization is concerned, this question must be approached pragmatically and without ideological prejudices. Even if it makes sense that there is a private defense industry to enable innovators, which are not necessarily members of the civil service, to perform useful work, we nevertheless have no intention of changing the status of most of the existing state-owned enterprises. Under no circumstances must French defense industries be permitted to come under the control of foreign capital. If subcontracting leads to multinational ventures, they must remain under French control.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MARKET, PARTNERS FOR RAFALE REPORTEDLY LACKING

Paris LIBERATION in French 16 Sep 86 p 15

[Article by Frederic Fillioux: "Strategy: Dassault is Backing Rafale, Despite Problems. Technologically superior, the French aircraft should find market openings. However, the competition is tough."]

[Text] On a double page of the American magazine AVIATION WEEK, an advertisement for Avions Marcel Dassault Breguet Aviation (AMDBA) announces the technological advance of its newest product, the Rafale, which has just had a remarkable demonstration at the Farnborough air show: "1995 is today." On a second level, this advertisement might also reflect the subconscious of the company. Its future from now until the end of the century is essentially tied to this new aircraft. The market for corporate aircraft is stagnating and accounts for only 10 percent of Dassault's orders, the total of which reached 19.6 billion francs in 1985.

The future for the Rafale is uncertain, as the remainder of the current or future production of the company is subject to the pressure of a vice in which European and American jaws tend to reduce its market share. The choice, which has consisted of developing a new fighter plane in competition with a European consortium is a bold gamble. Dassault confidently believes that the technological superiority of the Rafale is itself sufficient to insure commercial outlets. For the French aircraft manufacturer, it is unthinkable for them to contribute their know-how as a wedding gift to the consortium and, in the final analysis, only receive one-fourth of the benefits.

From a technical standpoint, the move seems to have been a good one. The European EAP (Experimental Aircraft Program) only had an unimpressive showing at Farnborough and the spectators saw some characteristics which could be disadvantageous in terms of strictly technological competition with the Rafale. The question is: Which arguments will dictate the choice of potential buyers? Will they be on a technical or political level? Study of the current situation is hardly encouraging for the Rafale.

The failure of the "market of the century"--Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish--to the advantage of the Americans risks having a negative effect on the Rafale because it involves replacing the F-16. One doesn't change to a different supplier like that. As for the German, British, Italian and

Spanish markets, being a participant in the Eurofighter (European fighter plane) program, it would be unlikely that they would betray the consortium by buying a French product. Madrid has gone further by preferring the American Hornet to the French Mirage 2000 for the time being; this market was recently eliminated for the Vauresson company. Even the Saudis have abandoned the Mirage by buying the German-Italian Panavia.

What is left for Dassault, which over the short term must make do with its Mirage 2000? Developing countries eager for French armaments are bad credit risks. "We cannot say anything," it is said at company headquarters, "but we are confident. Contacts made at Farnborough have convinced us that several countries--Europeans and others--are interested in the Rafale...." At present, the only sure thing comes from the French Army; it intends to purchase 335 aircraft, of which 85 are for the Navy. However, this assurance has not been followed by financing. Serge Dassault has continually been asking the Ministry of Defense for financing which would allow him to carry out tests of the prototype beyond next year. The Rafale program is extremely demanding; it will require an additional 27 billion francs between now and 1995.... "In one way or another, the government will pay," commented an Air Force officer. "There is a future for the French aerospace industry."

In financial circles, unwavering confidence is displayed. The technical nature of the company is in itself a guarantee of a long-term outlook. Dassault's work on the Hermes spacecraft, the interest American manufacturers have shown in the technological breakthroughs in advanced materials and in computer-aided aircraft design provide a certain amount of assurance for the stockholders. However, stock market analysts are convinced that increased foreign collaboration has become essential. Contacts with large companies such as Northrop, Lockheed, or Mitsubishi, which Dassault is open to, are welcomed as positive signs. The French manufacturer has maintained silence on this subject since it concerns the state of its research on techniques allowing an aircraft to go undetected by radar.

The Stealth (stealth bomber) will be the basic gamble for the end of the century. In this particular area, where the shape of an aircraft is just as important as the materials it is made from, the Dassault researchers are much further along than they will admit.... This could give the Rafale a decisive advantage over its European competition. This is an advantage which will be enough to counteract political maneuvers affecting the signing of large military contracts.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

DCAN STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AT CHERBOURG SHIPYARDS DESCRIBED

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 13 Sep 86 pp 4-9

[Article by Gen Castellan, Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction]

[Text] Located at the tip of the Cotentin peninsula, the Cherbourg naval construction and weapons yard does not enjoy what might be called the most favorable of industrial geographic environments. With its work force of 4,850, it far outstrips all other plants in the Normandy region. The only industry that may be compared with it is the COGEMA complex at The Hague, which reprocesses spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants. The other industries are far smaller: Alcatel, with a work force of 1,100, the CMN naval shipyard, with 1,050, and the nuclear-powered electrical generating plant at Flamanville, with 500 workers.

5,000 Workers and Two Submarines

The Cherbourg DCAN is indeed a huge industrial undertaking. Top-level personnel (engineers in shipyard operations, experts in studies and technologies, officers in the technical and administrative branch) contract engineers and engineer technicians engaged in design and construction) number 221; that works out to a 4.5-percent cadre rate, which is extremely low by comparison with levels common in comparable industrial sectors. Second-level personnel (executive cadres) number 660.

In addition to these 4,850 people, some 800 or so more in 1986, worked in the various DCAN installations on construction, refitting, or maintenance under subcontracting arrangements with private firms. The subcontracting figure is expected to grow considerably in 1988 and over the following years.

DCAN's organization is remarkably simple, and ideally suited to production of its single product: submarines. Its organization is based primarily on two major sections:

--the Design and Testing Section, including the Office of Ship Design and the Center for technical testing and evaluations at Cherbourg (CETEC);

--the production section, including all of DCAN's shops and yards.

In addition to these two mega-sections, there are the usual sections: personnel, acquisition and finance, infrastructure and logistics, and another group specially created to study refitting of the construction sector. A recently created quality control section embraces all the services responsible for monitoring and insuring the quality of our products, while a powerful bank of computers is busy in particular on developing a major system for computer-assisted design and fabrication, as well as computerized production management.

#### Missions Centered on New Construction

The percentage distribution of on-the-job hours for DCAN's labor force in 1985, according to the major production lines shows that fleet and munitions activities (11.2 percent) is relatively marginal. Following the retirement of the experimental submarine Gymnote in mid-1986, this sector is busy with the small fleet of surface craft based in Cherbourg: dispatch boats, sub-chasers, and minesweepers, coastal patrol boats and tenders.

Our "miscellaneous" activities (5.8 percent) account for an equally minimal percentage of on-the-job hours for the labor force; however, that "miscellaneous" category includes general studies of equipment and installations on submarines built at CETEC, and which are vital to the development of future vessels.

The biggest share of our activity (83 percent) lies in new construction or major refitting for submarines, which is the prime mission at DCAN Cherbourg. After serving as technical support for STCAN in defining the technical specifications for submarines, DCAN Cherbourg was assigned the task of submarine development and construction. Nevertheless, the following missions are outside DCAN Cherbourg's province when it comes to new construction:

--The nuclear reactor that powers the submarine is built by CEA, working with the naval construction and naval weapons establishment (ECAN) at Indret as a sub-contractor;

--The propulsion system, which is also handled by ECAN at Indret;

--The vast majority of equipment for weapons system and navigation is supplied by STCAN, while DCAN Cherbourg is in charge of their on-board verification and installation, as well as for testing them.

#### SNLE: Today, It's All Retrofitting

DCAN Cherbourg has built all the SNLEs now in service: the latest one was the Inflexible, carrying the M4 missile; it was delivered early in 1985.

It no longer builds any SNLEs, but it handles all repairs and retrofitting on those that carried the M 20 missile to ready them to receive the M4 missile. Cherbourg tackled the first retrofitting, on the Tonnant in 1985, and the job should be finished by 1987, to be followed by that of the Terrible. The Indomptable and the Foudroyant will be retrofitted at Brest.

This retrofitting activity emerges at Cherbourg with the activation of a nuclear sector; a nuclear shop equipped to handle on- and off-loadings as well as storage for fuel elements in the nuclear propulsion system went into operation at the beginning of 1985 to handle Tonnant's nuclear "heart."

#### Building SNAs

DCAN Cherbourg has been assigned the mission of building Rubis-type submarines.

SNAs 1 and 2, the Ruby and the Sapphire are already in service, based at Toulon.

The SNA 3, the Casablanca, was unveiled at official testing late in April 1986 and will be operational very early in 1987. SNA 4, the Emerald, was launched in April 1986; it will be entered in official tests in mid-1987.

SNA 5 right now is building in drydock; it will be launched in mid-1987.

SNA 6 was put in drydock in mid-1986; most of the sections of its thick hull are already built.

Lastly, SNA 7's armor plates have been delivered and construction of the thick hull sections began in 1986.

SNA 8, called for in the military plans, has not yet been authorized.

#### SNLE-NG Gets More Power

After a relative decline in the work load in 1987, due to the impossibility of handling retrofits for both Tonnant and Terrible simultaneously, DCAN Cherbourg will be getting a very heavy work-load in 1988, 1989, and 1990, running far beyond the yearly 7 million hours of production, attributable primarily to the commissioning of the first SNLE-NG, concomitant with continuation of construction of the SNA and with the retrofit for the Terrible.

A basic feature of DCAN Cherbourg is the considerable size of the unit of production it turns out by comparison with its annual volume of business. Accordingly, building a single SNA represents 50 percent of its annual volume of business, retrofitting a SNLE to receive the M<sub>4</sub> means a year's work, and building an SNLE means half again as much work per year.

This feature has the advantage of relatively simple management; the small number of products in work makes it easier to hold down the costs of these products. There is another side to that, though, which is the extreme sensitivity of industrial management of the entire operation to a major change in the timetable for construction of ships abuilding.

DCAN Cherbourg's future, as a result, lies in building SNLE-NGs. Preparations for that future can be seen in two remarkable lines of focus for these exceptional efforts: one has to do with complete overhaul of DCAN's construction sector; the other concerns a great many studies that will be needed to prepare for construction of the first SNLE-NG.

## New Construction Dock; No More Skid Launches

The construction docks at DCAN Cherbourg, although they had undergone some improvements in connection with the current SNLEs, insofar as their basic structures are concerned, date back to the last century. The practical impossibility of relying on these infrastructures to build submarines even bigger than the current Redoutable type led us to the decision to build an entirely new complex.

The dimensions adopted for this complex will enable us to build submarines 150 meters long and displacing 14,000 tons in surface operation at the rate of one every 24 months, and the potential for possible further expansion to build 170-meter boats with 16,000 ton displacement, and to step up our production rate.

This increase in size as well as the thickness of armor required means that we are going to need tremendous casting and moulding capacity: our biggest press will be upgraded from 4,000 tons to 12,000 tons; the conveyor will have to be built with a new steel with very high elasticity, whose standard thickness must be on the order of 75 mm (about 30 mm is required in the current SNLEs); our largest milling machine must be able to handle pieces weighing 250 tons and measuring 13 mm in diameter instead of pieces weighing 50 tons and measuring 11 mm in diameter.

The undertaking was turned to advantage in the task of defining new construction measures aimed at enhancing productivity and at insuring better quality control. The new submarines will no longer be built in canted docks and launched on completion, but built in level docks and launched by a special device.

The basic idea is construction in "sections"; the submarine will be built on the basis of a limited number of cylindrical slices (five of them in the case of the SNLE-NG) called sections; the sections will not be fitted together until a much later stage in the work; this approach will enable us to get well along toward installation of these sections by taking advantage of easy access through the stern and bow. The vessel will be launched practically complete and its stay in the finishing yard will be very short by comparison with our current submarines.

The principle of flat construction, however, poses two problems: the first is to devise a transport system capable of moving the sections (more than 2,000 tons), and then moving the submarines (more than 10,000 tons); the approach we have chosen is a system of "walkers," a kind of jacks that will allow step-by-step movements. The system already exists, but it will need further development before it is fit to carry loads of that order.

The second is to devise a launching system: such a system is currently in the study stages, and several possible solutions are available.

Finally, one last research goal is improvements in working conditions. DCAN Cherbourg's installations--some of them, as I said earlier--date back to the last century and conditions in general made improvements imperative. We took

advantage of the disruption entailed in the new construction to do something effective about the principal health hazards: noise and smoke. Considerable effort went into the hull division to distance the noisiest areas from the rest of the yard and soundproof them. The results have been remarkable. Furthermore, oxyacetylene torches, which were used to cut through plates and were a major source of toxic fumes, are now used in a separate wing of the plant proper.

#### Studies Under Way for the New Generation of SNLEs


The SNLE-NG boats of the future, insofar as concerns DCAN Cherbourg, will be innovative, thanks to:

--Use of a new steel with very high elasticity. Winning approval for this new steel and the concomitant alterations in welding procedures has involved some very complicated studies. The features of this welding process involve very high temperatures, which make manual welding extremely difficult. Furthermore, the huge quantities of metal to be moved make manual procedures very laborious in a number of instances. Besides, a majority of welds will be done by means of various automatic procedures, according to the specifications of the welds.

The adoption of the new steel, the vast size of the structures to be built, and the thickness of the metal involved will call for complicated and repeated testing. A great many models have been built and tested, then destroyed in CETEC's high-pressure test chambers. These are backed up by a testing and approval structure consisting of a full-scale section of a submarine, now nearing completion.

--The concern with getting the quietest possible boat. The studies required to attain an acceptable level of operating stealth to counter the future threat are extremely complex. It would have been impossible to conduct such studies properly without a powerful CFAO system already developed and tested. This system, which required major efforts and a good deal of time on the part of the computer people, but also and most importantly, on the part of the Study Bureau personnel, will be operational by the fall of 1986.


--A new construction method. Building a ship in sections means that you have to take the changes into account from the very beginning of studies. Making such allowance is reflected on one hand by special studies on installation so as to assure the soundness of the connections and, on the other, by ample lead-time for completion of studies, a departure from earlier practice, so that sections may be installed on time; this latter injunction is vital if we are to achieve the anticipated gain in productivity from the sectional construction system.



A Landscape Redrawn

Overall view of the shipyard: top, left: South Zone

1. New hull shop
2. Future construction yard (assembly sheds for SNLEs)
3. Launching device for the SNLEs
4. Old docks 3 and 4 (used for SNA assembly)



Submarine Construction Yards

Before expansion and reorganization (bottom, left)

1. Docks 3 and 4
2. SNLE prefabrication
3. Cast-iron construction shops
4. SMA prefabrication

After expansion and reorganization (bottom, right)

5. Docks 3 and 4
6. Section prefabrication
7. SNLE launching ramp
8. Construction yard
9. Hull Shop

## A Future Filled With Promise

DCAN Cherbourg today stands in the forefront of the most advanced industrial undertakings in France and in the world. Neither its prestigious past nor its latter-day achievements mean more to it than a step in its history; the skills of its people, their pride and enthusiasm are totally focused on preparing for a future that looks promising indeed.

[Box insert, pp 8, 9]

The shops sector consists primarily of a new hull yard as well as new buildings for painting, plumbing, and monitoring welded structures. The hull yard contains six major bays. Three of these bays are used for work on relatively small elements, in shaping, test-sampling, assembly, and adjustments. Two bays house the great milling machines for thick plates and the giant lathe that finishes the couplings. The third bay handles construction of the interior bulkheads for the new submarines.

The construction sector occupies two very large bays: one for heavy prefabrication where the sections are built, and a fabrication bay proper, where the sections are positioned, installations made, and then joined together to form the complete submarine. These two main bays are flanked standard support shops and by a nuclear assembly shop.

The buildings for painting, plumbing, and inspection of welded components are now 100-percent operational.

The first three bays in the hull shop are operational; the two heavy machinery bays are now in the process of installation and will be operational by the end of this year, as will the bulkhead-construction bay.

The old cast-iron buildings, and a portion of the light-metals shop are now being demolished to make room for construction of the expanded yards which will begin in the fall of 1986 and be operational in 1988.

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ENERGY

FRANCE

## DECREASING ENERGY COSTS HELP REDUCE DEFICIT

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Oct 86 p 35

[Unattributed article: "Energy Makes the Difference -- France's Foreign Trade During First 6 Months of 1986"]

[Text] The French Foreign Trade Center [CFCE] noted that during the first 6 months of 1986 France's foreign trade balance, recorded in FOB-FOB customs figures (Footnote 1) (Imports and exports are calculated free on board, FOB, while import results calculated by the month take into account the cost of insurance and freight, CIF.), showed a deficit of 10.7 billion francs gross (as against 18.2 billion during the first 6 months of 1985) and of 7.2 billion in figures corrected for seasonal variations (as against 14.2 billion).

The main figures for the first 6 months of the year, compared to the first 6 months of the previous year, are as follows:

- Stability of the balance for agricultural food products (plus 12.5 billion francs, as against plus 13.3 billion);
- A 40.3 billion franc reduction of the energy bill (minus 59.2 billion as against minus 99.5 billion) due to a drop in the price of imported petroleum products;
- A very strong erosion of the surplus of industrial products (plus 19.3 billion as against plus 45.2 billion). On a monthly average, manufactured products, which had a surplus of 7.5 billion francs in 1985, have dropped to a surplus of 3.2 billion during the first 6 months of 1986.

### Geographic Evolution

Looking at the details of the industrial balance, one notes that raw materials and semi-finished products have lost 11.5 billion francs, private professional equipment 9.7 billion, electronics for mass consumption 1.9 billion, automobiles-commercial vehicles and spare parts 1.6 billion and common consumer goods 4.8 billion. Only military equipment has gone up, going from plus 13.9 billion francs during the first 6 months of 1985 to plus 17.5 billion during the first 6 months of 1986.

The balance by zone and by country, in gross figures, shows the following variations:

- Slight improvement of the deficit with the OECD countries (minus 40 billion as against minus 43.8 billion);
- An improvement also in the deficit with the EEC countries (minus 29.5 billion as against minus 38.6 billion). This improvement is due to better trade with Great Britain (plus 13.6 billion from one half year to the next) and the Netherlands (plus 3.2 billion), both of which are energy exporting countries. But the balance of trade with the Federal Republic of Germany, our main trading partner, is deteriorating noticeably (minus 18.4 billion as against minus 13.8 billion).

Similarly, there is a continued deterioration of our deficits with the United States and Japan.

- Improvement with the OPEC countries, where the deficit went from minus 16.8 billion francs during the first 6 months of 1985 to minus 8.2 billion during the first 6 months of 1986.

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*21 Dec. 1986*

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